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"Not on My Beach": Local California Initiatives to
Prevent Onshore Support Facilities for Offshore
Oil Development
The leasing of federal offshore lands along the California coast for
oil and gas development has engendered one of the most heated federal-
state environmental conflicts in recent years. The battle between the State
of California and the federal government on this issue has raged since
1945, both in Congress and in the federal courts.1
The conflict has centered on the state and local governments' ability
to affect decisions that may have tremendous effects on their coastlines
and economies. Offshore development threatens sensitive coastal areas
1. On September 28, 1945, President Harry Truman issued a "Proclamation on the
Continental Shelf" stating that the United States Government "regards the natural resources
of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas contiguous to the coasts
of the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control." Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 Fed.
Reg. 12,305 (1945).
Secretary of Interior Harold Ikes "persuaded President Truman to overrule Attorney
General Tom Clark's objections and bring suit against California under the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction." Miller, Offshore Federalism: Evolving Federal-State Relations in Off-
shore Oil and Gas Development, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 407 (1984). In 1947, the Supreme
Court, rejecting prior rulings in this area, held that the federal government had "paramount
rights" over the area three miles seaward from the normal low water mark on the California
coast. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947). The Court made similar holdings in
OCS cases brought by Maine, Louisiana, and Texas. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515,
528 (1975); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 705 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707, 719 (1950).
Congress passed two acts in 1953 that helped to clarify the federal-state jurisdictional
issues. The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1953) (amended 1978), ceded any
federal interest in the lands within three miles of the coast, while confirming the federal gov-
ernment's interest in the area seaward of the three-mile limit. The Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1953) [hereinafter OCSLA], declared that the "subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its
jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition.... ." The OCSLA also established procedures
for federal leasing of OCS land to develop mineral resources. See generally Miller, supra, at
402-14; Annotation, Adminstration, and Construction, under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et. seq.), of Leases to Explore for Oil and Gas Desposits
under Continental Shelf, 31 A.L.R. FED 615 (1977).
In 1978, Congress reformulated the 1953 OCSLA with the passage of the OCSLA
Amendments of 1978 Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978)(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456-
1456(a), 1464 (1982); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (1982)). These amendments sought
to provide a more detailed statutory frame work for OCS leasing and development as part of
President Jimmy Carter's national energy legislation to reduce United States dependence on
foreign energy sources. Congress sought to expedite OCS development by seeking to ensure
coastal states that strict technological and environmental controls would be used by offshore
operations. See 43 U.S.C § 1332(3)(b) (1986).
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not only with oil spills and air and water pollution, but also with the
development of extensive onshore support facilities such as refineries,
pipelines, oil and gas separation facilities, tanker farms, and other staging
areas. Indeed, these support facilities present a greater and more immedi-
ate threat to coastal areas than do the potential long-term hazards of oil
spills and other environmental consequences of offshore development. 2
Onshore support facilities require considerable amounts of scarce
coastal lands that are highly valued both recreationally and aesthetically.
They also demand local governmental expenditures for new roads,
schools, and fire and police protection, well before tax revenues from the
offshore development are realized. New utilities may be required and
demands from these new facilities will burden already limited municipal
water supplies and sewage treatment facilities.3 As a result of these po-
tentially profound economic, social, and environmental effects resulting
from the development of the mineral resources of the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS), state and local governments have attempted to influence the
federal leasing process.
State and local governments have had varied success in affecting fed-
eral decision making. California, for example, obtained a series of con-
gressional moratoria4 on offshore leasing along certain areas of the
California coast. In Secretary of Interior v. California,5 however, the
Supreme Court held that federal offshore leasing did not require that
states approve the tracts as "consistent" with coastal programs author-
2. See CITY OF SANTA CRUZ, UNDERSTANDING THE OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVEL-
OPMENT PROCESS: A CITIZENS GUIDE 71-85 (1986) [hereinafter CITIZENS GUIDE]; Impact of
Moratoria on OCS Leasing in Federal Waters Adjacent to the Coastline of the State of Califor-
nia: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
329 (1985) (testimony of John A. Saurenman, Deputy Att'y Gen., California State Att'y Gen-
eral's Office) [hereinafter Impact of Moratoria on OCS Leasing]; MINERAL MANAGEMENT
SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, PROPOSED FIVE YEAR OCS OIL AND GAS LEAS-
ING PROGRAM JAN. 1987-DEC. 1991, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT IV.B.8-
18,19, IV.B.9-24 (1986) [hereinafter OCS LEASING PLAN]. For a discussion of the potentially
greater impacts associated with onshore support facilities see Hildreth, The Coast: Where En-
ergy Meets the Environment, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 253, 261 (1976). "Generally, the advan-
tages of oil and gas development accrue to the larger region involved whereas the
disadvantages tend to be localized in the vicinity of the development." Id. at 262; see also
Breeden, Federalism and the Development of the Outer Continental Shelf Mineral Resources, 28
STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1107-08 (1976) ("one of the major problems is that OCS oil development
is not really 'offshore' ").
3. See Breeden, supra note 2, at 1107-08. For example, Bodega Bay in Sonoma County
already has a building moratorium in place because of a lack of water. Sonoma Measure A
§ 30-2(6) (Nov. 4, 1986). See infra note 13.
4. California offshore leasing moratoria have been included in Department of Interior
Appropriations bills from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal year 1985. Hodel Criticizes Panetta's
Efforts to Restore Oil Lease Ban Off California, [16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 52, at 2265 (Apr. 25, 1986).
5. 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
ONSHORE SUPPORT FACILITIES INITIATIVES
ized pursuant to the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).6
As a result, state and local governments lost their most effective tool in
influencing federal selection of tracts early in the process before potential
discoveries of offshore resources create an overwhelming economic impe-
tus in the direction of development. 7 Local groups and elected officials
became frustrated with the resulting protracted stalemate, their inability
to affect the Department of Interior's seemingly relentless march toward
leasing off the California coast, and the perceived acquiescence of Gover-
nor George Deukmejian.
When Congress lifted the moratorium on offshore leasing in the
winter of 1985,8 local groups undertook a new strategy to prevent off-
6. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1985).
7. See Note, Watt v. California: Supreme Court Sinks Consistency Review of Offshore Oil
Leases, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 131, 145-47 (1985); Note, Federal "Consistency" Under the
Coastal Zone Management Act - A Promise Broken by Secretary of Interior v. California, 15
ENVTL. L. 153, 178-79 (1984); Comment, Reappraisal of State Interests in Outer Continental
Shelf Lease Sales Under the Coastal Zone Management Act: Secretary of Interior v. California,
29 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 277, 293-94 (1985); Comment, The Seaweed Rebellion
Revisited: Continuing Federal-State Conflict in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20 WILLAMETrE L.
REv. 83, 137-40 (1984); Casenote, Secretary of Interior v. California: Its Direct Effects on the
Coastal Zone Management Act, 8 G.M.U. L. REv. 197, 217-19 (1985).
8. This decision and the events following it have had numerous political repercussions.
The 1985 Interior Appropriations bill directed the Department of Interior and the California
congressional delegation to enter negotiations to settle the long-term stalemate between the
parties that had resulted in four consecutive moratoria on offshore leasing in northern and
central California and certain sensitive southern California areas.
On July 16, 1985, the Secretary of Interior and the California delegation reached an agree-
ment whereby two percent of the previously moratorium-banned tracts would be opened to
leasing and three test wells would be allowed in northern California. The remainder of the
moratorium areas would be protected until the year 2000. See generally Impact of Moratoria
on OCS Leasing in Federal Waters Adjacent to the Coastline of the State of California: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-61 (1986)
(testimony of Rep. Leon E. Panetta).
On September 10, 1985, Secretary of Interior Donald Hodel abandoned the agreement
under oil company pressure. Hodel's reneging on the congressional agreement created a polit-
ical uproar and seriously damaged his reputation with the coastal governments and their repre-
sentatives. Hodel Backs Out of California Agreement on Lease Sales; Panetta to Seek Bans
Again, [16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 869, 869-70 (Sept. 13, 1985).
After Hodel killed the agreement, the California congressional delegation sought to rein-
state the 1986 moratorium. That effort lost by one vote in the House Appropriations Commit-
tee. House Panel Reports Continuing Resolution, Rejects Oil Lease Ban Off California Coast,
[16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1448, 1449 (Nov. 29, 1985).
In February 1986, Hodel announced a new five year leasing program that would open
nearly the entire California coast to OCS development. The plan would lease tracts compris-
ing nearly I billion acres over a five year period and included previously untouched areas off
Humboldt and Mendocino Counties. Five-Year Offshore Oil Leasing Program Proposed by Inte-
rior Would Omit Some Areas, [16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1881,
1881-82 (Feb. 14, 1986). This chain of events created the highly charged political climate that
precipitated the statewide onshore support facility initiative movement. See Payton, Strong
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shore leasing along their coastlines: enacting ordinances 9-by vote of the
board of supervisors or city council, or through voter initiative-that
prohibit the siting and development of onshore support facilities such as
refineries, pipelines, or oil processing or storage facilities for offshore oil
and gas operations.10 One type of ordinance places an absolute ban on
the siting and development of onshore support facilities.II Another type,
modeled after the City of Santa Cruz initiative, allows siting and develop-
Opposition Voiced to Offshore Oil Drilling In State, Oakland Tribune, Mar. 22, 1986, at A-9,
col. 1; Castro, Oil and Water; To Drill or Not to Drill, TIME, Apr. 7, 1986, at 50.
9. For ease of reference, I refer to "onshore support facility ordinances" as including
ordinances enacted by both voter initiative and by-legislative action of county boards of super-
visors or city councils. The phrase "onshore support facility ordinance" also refers to both the
facility bans and voter referenda models.
10. As of March 15, 1987, 14 cities and counties had adopted these onshore facilities
ordinances. Localities that adopted such initiatives in the 1986 November elections include
Monterey County, San Luis Obispo County, San Mateo County, Sonoma County, City of
Monterey, City of Morro Bay, City of Oceanside, City of San Diego, and City and County of
San Francisco. Localities with previously adopted ordinances include County of Santa Cruz,
City of San Luis Obispo, and City of Santa Cruz. Later, ordinances were adopted by the City
Council of Redondo Beach and Point Arena.
11. For example, City of Morro Bay, Cal., Ordinance 293 (Oct. 27, 1986), states:
Facilities, equipment, support vessels, any other aids for ocean, bay or estuary oil
exploration, development and production are prohibited within the City limits of
Morro Bay, onshore or within the harbor and in waters elsewhere within the City's
boundaries. No permits or other authorization shall be issued by the City of Morro
Bay or its agents which would allow such support.
City and County of San Francisco, Cal., Initiative Measure N, app. to City Charter (Nov.
4, 1986). Measure N places a two year moratorium on the development of crude oil and gas
processing and support facilities. These facilities are defined as (a) refineries, (b) pipelines and
pipeline facilities, (c) crude oil tanker facilities, (d) storage facilities, (e) staging areas, and (f)
waste disposal facilities. Id. § 2. Measure N also includes findings stating: "The development
of crude oil and gas processing and support facilities related to oil and gas drilling and produc-
tion may create unacceptable risks to the quality of life, the environment, and the long-term
economic well being of San Francisco." Id. § 1. These findings include the threats posed by oil
spills, drilling mud, and other by-products of the drilling process. Id.
The City of San Diego, Cal., Ordinance R-265,621 (May 5, 1986) amends the city charter
by adding § 2.1, which states that:
[n]either the City Council nor any officer or employee of the City shall take any
action, or permit any action to be taken, which directly or indirectly authorizes or
permits the construction, operation or maintenance of any pipeline within the City
for the transmission of any crude oil or natural gas taken or removed from any off-
shore crude oil or natural gas drilling or pumping operations within 100 nautical
miles of the coastline of the County of San Diego.
The second provision includes an identical prohibition on:
the construction, operation or maintenance of any commercial or industrial facility
within the City, including but not necessarily limited to crude oil or natural gas
storage facilities, which operates directly or indirectly in support of any offshore
crude oil or natural gas drilling or pumping operations within 100 nautical miles of
the County of San Diego.
See also City of Oceanside, Cal., Proposition S (not yet codified) (identical to the City of San
Diego's Proposition B).
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ment of onshore support facilities only after a voter referendum in which
a majority of voters approve the new development.1 2 Specifically, the
Santa Cruz model requires that a majority of voters approve the siting
amendment before the board of supervisors can amend the county's
coastal land use plan.1 3
12. County of Monterey, Cal., Measure A, Ordinance 3167 (Nov. 4, 1986). Section
16.55.020(2) provides:
the local government determination required by Public Resources Code Section
30515 shall include a vote of the qualified electors of Monterey County.... and no
local government determination approving [an amendment of the LCP to allow on-
shore support facilities] shall be valid unless a majority of the electors voting in such
election approve the amendment proposed.
County of San Luis Obispo, Cal., Initiative Measure A, Ordinance 2288 (Nov. 4, 1986).
Measure A provides that
[no] permit, entitlement, lease, or other authorization of any kind within the County
of San Luis Obispo which would authorize or allow the development, construction,
installation, or expansion of any onshore support facility for offshore oil and gas
activity shall be final unless such authorization is approved by a majority of the votes
cast by a vote of the people of the County of San Luis Obispo in a general or special
election. For the purpose of this ordinance, the term "onshore support facility"
means any land use, installation, or activity required to support the exploration, de-
velopment, production, storage, processing, transportation or related activities of off-
shore energy resources.
Id. § 1.
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, CAL. CODE § 16.55 (July 22, 1986) is identical in content to
Monterey County Ordinance 3167.
City of Monterey, Cal., Measure G, Ordinance 86-134 (Nov. 4, 1986). Section 4(b) pro-
vides: "No zoning changes to accommodate onshore support facilities for offshore oil and gas
drilling shall be enacted without a vote of the people of the City of Monterey."
City of Santa Cruz, Cal., Ordinance 85-70 (Nov. 5, 1985). This ordinance states that "No
zoning changes to accommodate onshore support facilities for offshore oil and gas drilling shall
be enacted without a vote of the people of the City of Santa Cruz." Id. § 4 (2).
13. The Santa Cruz model specifically seeks to avoid potential federal preemption or
commerce clause conflicts posed by an outright moratorium. See infra sections II, III.
For an example of a county initiative adopting this approach see County of Sonoma, Cal.,
Ordinance 3592R (Nov. 4, 1986). The Sonoma ordinance provides in § 30-3(a) that
[w]hen any person proposes to undertake the development within Sonoma County of
any on-shore energy facility relating to the exploration or development of off-shore
oil or gas resources and requests an amendment of the County's Certified Local
Coastal Program to facilitate such development, a determination by the Board of
Supervisors pursuant to Public Resources Code section 30515 that the proposed
amendment is in conformity with the policies of the Coastal Act and the Certified
Local Coastal Program should be amended to incorporate such development shall
not be effective unless a majority of the electors of Sonoma County, in a general or
special election, approve the proposed amendment.
Other localities have adopted similar measures to Sonoma County. See City of Redondo
Beach, Cal., Ordinance 2462 (Jan. 20, 1987); City of Point Arena, Cal., Ordinance 124 (Feb.
24, 1987).
For a hybrid model of an outright prohibition and a voter initiative requirement, see
County of San Mateo, Cal., Measure A (Nov. 4, 1986) (not yet codified), which repeals the
"Energy Component" of the San Mateo County Local Coastal Program. Section 3, pt. 4.25
"[p]rohibit[s] onshore support facilities for offshore oil and gas from locating in the Coastal
July 1987]
Such ordinances raise a number of potential conflicts with state and
federal law, as well as a potential federal constitutional challenge under
the commerce clause. This Note explores these potential conflicts to de-
termine whether these local ordinances will withstand judicial scrutiny
and, if so, whether particular measures will fare better than others.
Section I discusses the threshold question of whether these measures
are consistent with the federal Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA). 14 Section I first analyzes whether the measures comport with
California's coastal program authorized by the California Coastal Act of
197615 and federally approved pursuant to the CZMA. Section IA con-
siders whether the California Coastal Commission can approve the meas-
ures as consistent with the energy siting provisions of the California
Coastal Act. Section IB then discusses federal consideration of the meas-
ures under the CZMA. Sections IC and ID discuss the consequences of
federal approval or rejection of the ordinances pursuant to the CZMA.
Section II analyzes whether these ordinances, even if approved
under the CZMA, are preempted by the federal Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA), which authorizes leasing, exploration, and devel-
opment of mineral resources on the federal OCS.16 This analysis involves
an examination of congressional intent in enacting the statute and recent
judicial opinions that suggest how a court may treat this federal-local
conflict.
Section III considers the local measures' regulation of interstate
commerce in offshore energy products and whether such regulation con-
stitutes an unconstitutional burdening of interstate commerce under a
"dormant" commerce clause analysis. Section IV explores the political
considerations raised by these onshore support facility ordinances. In
particular, this section discusses the political dangers and advantages for
local governments in adopting these ordinances.
Section V advises local governments of the most advantageous form
of ordinance (and statutory language) to obtain the desired political lev-
erage with energy companies and the federal government.
I. The Governmental Approval Process for Local Ordinances
By either banning onshore support facilities or requiring a voter ref-
erendum to allow their siting, these ordinances make changes in the local
governments' energy siting processes that may conflict with California's
Zone." Section 10 provides that "[t]his ordinance may be repealed or amended only by a
majority of the voters of San Mateo County voting in a valid election." Measure A also con-
tains an express prohibition of "pipelines for the transmission of offshore oil and gas." Id. § 3,
pt. 4.28.
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1985).
15. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987).
16. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1986).
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coastal management program as approved under the CZMA. Accord-
ingly, both the California Coastal Commission and the federal Office of
Ocean and Coastal Resource Management within the United States De-
partment of Commerce may need to determine the validity of these ordi-
nances under CZMA. To understand this process, it is necessary to
evaluate the cooperative federalism approach contained in the CZMA.
Congress enacted the CZMA in 1972 in response to a growing na-
tional concern over the need to preserve, protect, and wisely develop the
resources of the nation's coastal areas.17 Instead of drafting a compre-
hensive statute controlling coastal uses, however, Congress adopted a
voluntary program that sought to encourage each state to establish its
own separate coastal management program. 18 The CZMA encourages
the development of state programs in two ways: by providing monetary
assistance to states that develop and exercise management programs con-
sistent with its standards,19 and more importantly, by requiring that fed-
eral activities in or affecting the coastal zone conform with an approved
state program. 20
Before approving a state program, the Secretary of Commerce must
find that it satisfies a number of conditions imposed by Congress.21 One
such condition requires that a state management program contain provi-
sions allowing for consideration of the national interest in the planning,
siting, and development of major energy facilities that are necessary to
meet other than local energy demand. Section 1455(c)(3)(B) specifically
requires that
[t]he management program provides for adequate consideration of the
national interest involved in the planning for, and in the siting of, facili-
ties (including energy facilities in, or which significantly affect, such
state's coastal zone) which are necessary to meet requirements which are
other than local in nature. In the case of such energy facilities, the
Secretary shall find that the state has given such consideration to any
applicable interstate energy plan or program.22
The regulations promulgated by the National Oceanic Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA)23 implementing this section explain that
[t]he primary purpose of this requirement is to assure adequate consid-
eration by States of the national interest involved in the planning for
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451, 1452 (1985).
18. Id. § 1454; see also Legislative History, Pub. L. No. 92-583, S. Rep. No. 753, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-6, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4776-81.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) (1985).
20. Id. § 1456(a).
21. Id. § 1455(c)-(e).
22. Id. § 1455(c)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
23. NOAA, under the Department of Commerce, has the responsibility for administering
the Coastal Zone Management Act. The Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management
(OCRM), headed by an Assistant Secretary, has been delegated primary authority under the
Act.
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and siting of facilities (which are necessary to meet other than local
requirements) during (1) the development of the State's management
program, (2) the review and approval of the program by the Assistant
Administrator [of the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Manage-
ment], and (3) the implementation of the program as such facilities are
proposed. 24
These regulations require the state program to outline the decision
making process for facility siting; specifically, the program must indicate
where in that process the "national interest" will be considered. Thus,
NOAA's regulatory scheme envisions that when a state considers
whether to site a particular energy facility, it include the "national inter-
est" in the calculus of its decision making.25 This scheme does not re-
24. 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(c) (1986). Under the regulations a state in its coastal management
program must:
(1) Describe the national interest in the planning for and siting of facilities consid-
ered during program development.
(2) Indicate the sources relied upon for a description of the national interest in the
planning for and siting of the facilities.
(3) Indicate how and where the consideration of the national interest is reflected in
the substance of the management program. In the case of energy facilities in which
there is a national interest, the program must indicate the consideration given any
interstate energy plans or programs, developed pursuant to section 309 of the Act
which is applicable to or affect a State's coastal zone.
(4) Describe the process for continued consideration of the national interest in the
planning for and siting of facilities during program implementation, including a clear
and detailed description of the administrative procedures and decisions points where
such interest will be considered.
Id. § 923.52(c).
25. The NOAA regulations impliedly adopt the "procedural" perspective of the Senate
Report accompanying the 1976 amendments to the CZMA. The Senate Report states:
The Secretary of Commerce (through NOAA) should provide guidance and assist-
ance to the States under this section 305(b)(8), and under section 306, to enable them
to know what constitutes "adequate consideration of the national interest" in the
siting of energy facilities necessary to meet the requirements other than local in na-
ture. The Committee wishes to emphasize, consistent with the overall intent of the
Act, that this new [§ 305(b)](8) requires a State to develop, and maintain a planning
process, but does not imply intercession in specific siting decisions. The Secretary of
Commerce (through NOAA) in determining whether a coastal State has met the
requirements, is restricted to evaluating the adequacy of the process.
SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1975, S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, at 725, 760 (1976) (emphasis added).
The House Report on the 1972 Act explaining § 306(c)(8) can be read as implying a
substantive requirement.
To the extent that a state program does not recognize these overall national interests,
as well as the specific national interest in the generation and distribution of electric
energy ... or is construed as conflicting with any applicable statute, the Secretary
may not approve the state program until it is amended to recognize those Federal
rights, powers, and interests.
HousE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT,
H.R. REP. No. 1049, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
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quire, however, that a state identify in advance certain sites or general
areas for energy development.26 The provisions have been interpreted as
not "action-inducing"; in other words, they do not force a state to site
certain facilities considered to be in the national interest. The Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld this "procedural" interpretation of the CZMA national inter-
est provision in a suit brought by the American Petroleum Institute
(API) against the acting administrator of the federal Coastal Manage-
ment Program challenging the "final approval" of California's Coastal
Management Program.27 Thus, the national interest provisions are not
substantive requirements that would force a state to site an energy facil-
ity it considered not in its interest as long as the state considers "other
than local interests."28
Although the present energy siting provisions of the California
Coastal Act comport with CZMA's national interest provisions, the lo-
cally enacted ordinances may significantly alter the state's approved pro-
gram.2 9 To understand how, it is initially important to examine the
THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, at 322 (emphasis added); see generally,
Kanouse, Achieving Federalism in the Regulation of Coastal Energy Facility Siting, 8 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 533, 542 (1980).
26. See NOAA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COASTAL MANAGE-
MENT PROGRAM AND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 82, 65-73, 88 (1977)
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM].
27. American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979). API chal-
lenged NOAA's interpretation of § 306(c)(8) in a lawsuit seeking to enjoin "final approval" of
the California Coastal Management Program by the federal government. API argued that the
California coastal program lacked "explicit commitments" to act according to the national
interests in siting energy facilities. Id. at 1313. The Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning,
holding that "NOAA had properly considered the Congressional mandate in its program ap-
proval regulations." Id. at 1314. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Acting Administrator's
finding that California's program satisfied § 306(c)(8) was supportable and proceeded from a
correct interpretation of the CZMA. Id. at 1315.
28. See Whitney, Siting of Energy Facilities in the Coastal Zone: A Critical Regulatory
Hiatus, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 815 (1975) (arguing the need for action-inducing provi-
sions in CZMA to force states to site facilities considered in the national interest); see also
Kanouse, supra note 25, at 541-44 (concluding that the national interest provisions are proce-
dural rather than substantive requirements); Rubin, The Role of the Coastal Land Manage-
ment Act of 1972 in the Development of Natural Gas from the Outer Continental Shelf, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES LAWYER 399, 420-22 (1975) (while recognizing that the NOAA regulations are
not action-inducing, argues that although "there is no justification for totally prohibiting activ-
ity associated with offshore drilling because of the urgent need for energy resources .... Only
those facilities that are absolutely necessary for offshore operations should be permitted in
undeveloped areas of the coastal zone").
For a view contrary to Whitney's concerning the need for action-enforcing language and
an excellent discussion of the national interest provisions, see NOAA, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, THE CTARP ENERGY FACILITY SITING STUDY: COASTAL FACILITY SITING AND
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Vol. 1, at 97-102 (1979).
29. It is important to keep in mind that the California program was originally approved
during the Carter Administration. The Reagan Administration has adopted a differing inter-
pretation of the national interest provisions. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text; see
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general framework of the California Coastal Act and its relationship with
the federal CZMA.
A. Consideration at the State Level: The California Coastal Act
The legislature enacted the California Coastal Act of 1976 as a com-
prehensive scheme to govern development, preservation, and land use
planning for the entire California coastal zone. 30 Under the Coastal Act,
a local government within the coastal zone prepares and submits a local
coastal plan (LCP) to the California Coastal Commission.31 The LCP
consists of a local government's land use plans, zoning ordinances, zon-
ing district maps, and, within sensitive coastal resources areas, other im-
plementing actions. 32 The precise content of each LCP is determined by
the local government in full consultation with the Commission.33 The
LCP must meet the requirements of the Act and implement the Act's
provisions and policies at the local level. The Coastal Commission must
review and approve the LCP to ensure that it conforms with the specific
policies of the Act. 34 Once the Commission certifies the LCP, the local
government has authority to issue permits for development consistent
with the LCP.35
also Reagan Administration Turns to Courts to Limit Coastal Zone Management Act Program,
[17 Current Development] Env't Rep. (BNA) No.33, at 1334, 1334-36 (1986). This change in
approach makes it more difficult to analyze the initiatives' treatment at the federal level.
30. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987). The Coastal Act
of 1976 was a reformation of the California Coastal Initiative adopted by the California voters
in 1972.
The legislative findings in the 1976 Act state that "the California coastal zone is a distinct
and valuable natural resource of vital and enduring interest to all people"; that "the permanent
protection of the state's natural and scenic resources is a paramount concern"; that "it is
necessary to protect the ecological balance of the coastal zone"; and that "existing developed
uses and future developments that are carefully planned and developed consistent with the
policies of this division, are essential to the economic and social well-being of the people of this
state." Id. § 30001(a)-(d).
31. Id. § 30500(a).
32. Id. § 30108.6.
33. Id. § 30500(c).
34. See id. §§ 30200-30265.5 (Chapter Three). These policy areas include: public access
to the sea and shorelines (§§ 30210-30214); recreational use (§§ 30220-30224); protection of
the marine environment (§§ 30230-30236); protection of land resources (§ 30240 [environmen-
tally sensitive habitats]; § 30241 [agricultural land]; § 30243 [timberlands]; § 30244 [archaeo-
logical resources]); development (§§ 30250-30255); and industrial development (§§ 30260-
30265.5).
35. Id. § 30600.5. This authority to issue coastal development permits is often referred to
as "permitting authority." Until a LCP has been certified for the area, the Coastal Commis-
sion retains interim "permitting authority" for coastal development. Consequently, the permit
scheme is complicated because many localities have either not submitted LCPs or the Commis-
sion has rejected them. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND
RESEARCH, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON COASTAL DEVELOPMENT CONFLICTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS app. C (1985).
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Like the federal CZMA, the California Act allows for development
of land use plans at a lower level of government while ensuring that local
governments consider broader state interests. As a result of conscious
political compromise by the state legislature, however, the grounds upon
which the Coastal Commission can require changes in an LCP submitted
by local government are very limited. Public Resources Code section
30512.2 provides:
(a) The Commission's review of a land use plan shall be limited to its
administrative determination that the land use plan submitted by the
local government does, or does not, conform to the requirements of
Chapter Three....
(b) The Commission shall require conformance with the policies and
requirements of Chapter Three ... only to the extent necessary to
achieve the basic state goals specified in Section 30001.5.36
Thus, the Coastal Commission cannot require changes in an LCP that it
considers desirable but that are not necessary for conformance with the
basic state goals specified in section 30001.5 of the Coastal Act.37 Con-
sequently, an LCP amendment is subject to limited review at the state
level but may then be reviewed at the federal level on an entirely different
basis.38
While local governments subsequently may amend their approved
LCPs, section 30514 requires that the Commission approve such amend-
ments.39 Since LCPs consist of both land use plans and ordinances, a
36. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30512.2(a), (b) (West 1986). Section 30001.5 provides:
The Legislature further finds and declares that the basic goals of the state for the
coastal zone are to:
(a) Protect, maintain and, where feasible, enhance and restore the overall quality of
the coastal zone environment and its natural and artificial resources.
(b) Assure orderly, balanced utilization and conservation of coastal zone resources
taking into account the social and economic needs of the people of the state.
(c) Maximize public access to and along the coast and maximize public recreational
opportunities in the coastal zone consistent with sound resources conservation princi-
ples and constitutionally protected rights of private property owners.
(d) Assure priority for coastal-dependent and coastal-related development over other
development on the coast.
(e) Encourage state and local initiatives and cooperation in preparing procedures to
implement coordinated planning and development for mutually beneficial uses, in-
cluding educational uses, in the coastal zone.
37. See Letter from Peter Douglas, Executive Director of the California Coastal Commis-
sion to Peter Tweedt, Director of Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, Mar. 28,
1986 (letter on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
38. This paradox could leave the Commission in an awkward situation in which it real-
izes that an LCP will be rejected at the federal level (if considered an amendment to the state's
management program) on the basis of the CZMA national interest provisions. Because of the
Commission's differing and narrow standard of review, however, the Commission would have
to approve the LCP knowing it may rejected at the federal level.
39. CAL. PUB. Rr-s. CODE § 30514(a) (West 1986). Section 30514 provides: "A certified
coastal program and all local implementing ordinances, regulations, and other actions may be
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change in either requires the Commission's approval. As a result, when
either a county board of supervisors or voters through an initiative adopt
an ordinance banning onshore support facilities4° or allowing their siting
only after a voter referendum, in effect they may be amending their
LCPs.
Initially, the Coastal Commission must determine whether these or-
dinances are amendments of the local government's approved LCP. If
they are not, then Commission approval is not necessary. If, however,
the ordinances are considered amendments, then they are subject to the
Commission's approval. To determine whether an ordinance is an
amendment, the Commission must compare the current energy siting
provisions of the locality's LCP with the future provisions as altered by
the newly adopted ordinances.
These ordinances generally take two different approaches: voter ap-
proval of energy siting actions41 and outright bans on onshore facilities.
Because the two approaches may be treated differently by the Coastal
amended by the appropriate local government, but no such amendment shall take effect until it
has been certified by the commission."
40. The California Supreme Court in Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 571-73, 685 P.2d
1152, 1158-60, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801, 807-09 (1984), held that the California Coastal Act does not
preempt either the local planning authority or the power of the voters to act through referen-
dum. The referendum at issue sought to overturn the Santa Barbara City Council's approval
of a hotel and conference center development pursuant to an approved LCP. Id. at 564 & n.l,
685 P.2d at 1154 & n.1, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 803 & n.l.
41. Voter referenda raise an additional legal issue in that only legislative acts are properly
the subject of the referendum power. In Yost, the California Supreme Court made clear that
amendments to LCPs are legislative acts, subject to voter referendum, even though they refer
to particular sites. Id. at 570, 685 P.2d at 1157, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07. The problem is in
the area of conditional use permits, variances, and other adjudicatory or quasi-judicial acts
that may not be determined by a vote of the electorate. Arnel Dev. Co. v. Costa Mesa, 28 Cal.
3d 511, 518-519, 620 P.2d 565, 569-70, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 908-09 (1980). Rather, an adjudi-
catory administrative act such as a permit application procedure must be accompanied by
hearings and findings in order to protect the applicant's due process rights under the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution. San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council of
San Diego, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 211, 529 P.2d 570, 573, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (1975); Wiltshire v.
Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 296, 304, 218 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203-04 (1985).
The Wiltshire court, in addressing a very similar issue that dealt with an initiative that
required voter approval before a "waste-to-energy plant" could be sited in San Marcos, stated:
[s]uch plants can be sited only through the issuance of a special use permit. Those
permits are the product of the adjudicatory process. Due process of the law in that
setting requires notice and hearing .... Section I of the initiative denies those rights
by lodging adjudicatory powers in the electorate and is thus invalid.
Wiltshire, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 304, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (citation omitted). The Santa Cruz
ordinance provides for a voter referendum for both the LCP amendment and the issuance of
any individual permit for an onshore support facility. In light of Wiltshire and Arnel Develop-
ment, the referendum requirement for the issuance of a development permit may be invalid.
However, because these initiatives contain savings clauses in the event a section is held invalid
the LCP amendment referendum requirement will remain valid, as supported by Yost. Local
governments in California with ordinances that include a referendum requirement for permits
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Commission in the amendment determination process, each will be ana-
lyzed separately.
Under the referendum model, a board of supervisors first approves
the siting of an onshore support facility, and then submits the action to
the voters for approval. Because voter referenda leave intact the current
LCP criteria for industrial development in the county, they appear to be
only procedural and not substantive changes in the siting process. How-
ever, because they change the LCP energy siting process itself, these ref-
erenda ordinances will likely be seen as substantive amendments
requiring Commission approval. Furthermore, the state Coastal Com-
mission can override a local government's refusal to amend its LCP to
accommodate a major energy facility of more than local interest.42
By contrast, an outright prohibition of onshore support facilities
seems to be on its face a more substantive change. The Coastal Act re-
quires that local governments consider anticipated future energy facilities
while preparing their LCPs.43 Consequently, these LCPs may contain
siting priority provisions in anticipation of future decision making.44 The
Commission would regard the adoption of an ordinance strictly prohibit-
ing the siting of onshore support facilities as a repeal of these LCP siting
provisions and therefore would treat the ordinance as an LCP
amendment.45
If these ordinances are considered to be LCP amendments, the ques-
tion becomes whether the Commission or a reviewing court will uphold
are Monterey County, San Luis Obispo County, Santa Cruz County, City of Monterey, and
City of Santa Cruz.
42. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30515 (West 1986).
43. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N, COASTAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: THE CALIFOR-
NIA EXPERIENCE, A GUIDE FOR COASTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 13 (1981) [hereinafter
COASTAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT]; see CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001(d) (West 1986).
44. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 13513(a)(3) (1982) (Uses of More than Local Im-
portance); California Coastal Commission Local Coastal Program Regulation 00041, reprinted
in CALIFORNIA COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 5-8. See, e.g., San Luis
Obispo County's LCP containing a "performance standard approach" and applying three dif-
ferent standards of review before a project is approved depending on the type of facility or
activity and its location. Note that San Luis Obispo Measure A does not contain an outright
prohibition but rather provides for a voter referendum. COASTAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
supra note 43, at 11.
45. See, eg., County of San Mateo Measure A, supra note 13. But see City of San Diego
Ordinance R-265,261, supra note 11 (The ordinance prohibits any city employee or official
from "taking any action, or permiting any action to be taken, which directly or indirectly
authorizes or permits" the development of onshore support facilities for offshore operations
within 100 nautical miles of the coastline of the County of San Diego. By restricting the
discretion of city officials and officers rather than limiting land uses directly, this measure seeks
to avoid characterization as a zoning ordinance, which would require Coastal Commission
approval as a LCP amendment. The Coastal Commission has requested a legal opinion from
the California Attorney General as to the legal consequence of such de facto LCP amend-
ments. Given the broad definition of LCPs, it is likely that these discretion-limiting ordinances
will be considered LCP amendments subject to Commission approval.).
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them as consistent with the energy siting provisions of the Coastal Act.
Such a consideration could either arise in a noncase-specific situation
such as the Commission's certification of an LCP amendment, or in a
case-specific situation in which an energy company seeks the siting of a
specific energy facility that has been prohibited by a local ordinance.46
The California Coastal Act represents a political compromise be-
tween the need to protect the coastline from undesirable industrial devel-
opment and the recognition that because of economic necessity certain
coastal-dependent industries must be sited in the coastal zone. The legis-
lative findings in section 30001.2 of the Coastal Act set forth the tone and
approach taken toward energy facility siting:
The Legislature further finds and declares that, notwithstanding the
fact electrical generating facilities, refineries, and coastal-dependent de-
velopments, including ports and commercial fishing facilities, offshore
petroleum and gas development, and liquefied natural gas facilities,
may have significant adverse effects on coastal resources or coastal ac-
cess, it may be necessary to locate such developments in the coastal
zone in order to ensure that inland as well as coastal resources are
preserved and that orderly economic development proceeds within the
state.47
The Act's major energy siting provisions are contained in section
30260, which provides for siting of new coastal-dependent industrial de-
velopment if three requirements are met:4 8
Coastal-dependent industrial facilities shall be encouraged to locate or
expand within existing sites and shall be permitted reasonable long-
term growth where consistent with this division. However, where new
or expanded coastal-dependent industrial facilities cannot feasibly be
accommodated consistent with other policies of this division, they may
nonetheless be permitted in accordance with this section and Sections
30261 [relating to use of tanker facilities] 49 and 30262 [relating to oil
46. For example, the Coastal Commission will review the City of Morro Bay's ban of
onshore support facilities in the abstract without an energy company proposal before it seeking
to locate such a facility. Should the Commission approve the initiative as an LCP amendment,
an energy company that wishes to site such a facility in Morro Bay may seek state court review
of the Commission's decision.
47. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30001.2 (West 1986).
48. Id. § 30260. Other sections providing exemptions for energy and coastal-dependent
development from specific environmental restrictions of the Act include: § 30233 (exemption
from prohibition of diking, filling, or dredging open coastal waters, wetlands, estuaries, and
lakes); § 30235 (exemption from prohibition of new revetments, breakwaters, groins, harbor
channels, seawalls, cliff retaining walls, and other such construction that alters natural shore-
line processes); § 30250(b) (exemption from requirement that new development be located
within, or contiguous with, existing developed areas for "new hazardous industrial develop-
ment" such as liquified natural gas terminals).
49. Id. § 30261(a). Section 30261(a) provides:
Multicompany use of existing and new tanker facilities shall be encouraged to the
maximum extent feasible and legally permissible, except where to do so would result
in increased tanker operations and associated onshore development incompatible
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and gas development]50 if (1) alternative locations are infeasible or
more environmentally damaging; (2) to do otherwise would adversely
affect the public welfare; and (3) adverse environmental effects are miti-
gated to the maximum extent feasible. 51
Therefore, a proposed energy facility may be accommodated under cer-
tain circumstances even if it does not meet the general environmental
protection and development criteria of the Coastal Act.5 2
Ordinances that ban onshore support facilities in all circumstances
may conflict with these siting provisions. By prohibiting the siting of a
facility that meets the three prong test of section 30260, such ordinances
could conflict with the state Coastal Act.
The Commission's determination of whether these ordinances con-
flict with the Coastal Act's siting provisions depends upon four factors:
(1) whether the Commission interprets section 30260 as requiring the
siting of facilities that meet its conditions or as simply giving local gov-
ernments the option to site facilities that would otherwise violate the gen-
eral provisions of Chapter Three; (2) whether the Commission considers
onshore support facilities covered by the ordinances to be coastal-depen-
dent, coastal-related, or neither; (3) whether the Commission applies a
different analysis to the voter referendum as compared to the morato-
rium approach; and (4) what effect the Commission gives to its ultimate
override authority for major energy facilities under Section 30515. Each
of these factors will be examined separately.
In examining the first factor of the Commission's determination,
outright bans of onshore support facilities may conflict with section
30260 of the Act, which permits the siting of coastal-dependent facilities
otherwise inconsistent with the environmental protections of the Coastal
Act if the three prongs of that section are met.5 3 Thus, the key variable
is whether the Coastal Commission would reject an onshore support fa-
cility ban because of the potential conflict.
with the land use and environmental goals for the area. New tanker terminals
outside of existing terminal areas shall be situated as to avoid risk to environmentally
sensitive areas and shall use a monobuoy system, unless an alternative type of system
can be shown to be environmentally preferable for a specific site. Tanker facilities
shall be designed to (1) minimize the total volume of oil spilled, (2) minimize the risk
of collision from movement from other vessels, (3) have ready access to the most
effective feasible containment and recovery equipment for oil spills, and (4) have on-
shore deballasting facilities to receive any fouled ballast water from tankers where
operationally or legally required.
50. Id. § 30262. Section 30262 adds a number of provisions concerning geologic condi-
tions and monitoring; restrictions of platforms or islands in sea-lanes; and use of subsea plat-
forms, where environmentally safe, to protect coastal visual qualities.
51. Id. § 30260 (emphasis added).
52. The key word is "feasible," which the Act defines as "capable of being accomplished
in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, envi-
ronmental, social, and technological factors." Id. § 30108.
53. Id.
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This is only a potential conflict, since section 30260 does not require
siting of a facility that meets its statutory requirements. 54 Therefore, re-
jection of the ordinances on the ground that they require a result con-
trary to the Coastal Act's requirements seems improper. Section 30260
is simply part of the Coastal Act's planning guidelines, which provide
coastal-dependent development with an exemption from the environmen-
tal requirements of the Act so that local governments may, if they
choose, site coastal-dependent facilities that meet the terms of the exemp-
tion. The section's use of the term "may" conflicts with the view that the
coastal-dependent development provisions "require" that a local govern-
ment allow for such development. 55 Given the permissive language of
section 30260, even outright bans of onshore support facilities can be
approved.
However, should the Commission view the Coastal Act as requiring
the siting of coastal-dependent facilities, it must then determine whether
onshore support facilities covered by the ordinances are coastal-depen-
dent. Coastal-dependent developments or uses are those that "require a
site on, or adjacent to, the sea to be able to function at all."' 56 The Act
specifies ports and offshore oil and gas development as coastal-depen-
dent, although Commission decisions make clear that "not all activities
associated with such developments would be considered coastal-depen-
54. Lending support to this interpretation is section 30005, which provides in part:
No provision of [the Coastal Act] is a limitation on... the power of a city or county
... to adopt and enforce additional regulations, not in conflict with this act, imposing
further conditions, restrictions, or limitations with respect to any land or water use
or other activity which might adversely affect the resources of the coastal zone."
Id. § 30005. The California Supreme Court held in Yost v. Thomas that
[u]nder the act, local governments ... have the discretion to zone one piece of land to
fit any of the acceptable uses under the policies of the act, but they also have the
discretion to be more restrictive than the act. The Coastal Act sets minimum stan-
dards and policies with which local governments within the coastal zone must com-
ply; it does not mandate the action to be taken by a local government in implementing
local land use controls.
Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 572, 685 P.2d 1152, 1159, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801, 808 (1984)
(emphasis added).
55. This permissive interpretation is supported by a recent Commission decision holding
that the Commission's issuance of a development permit for a new hotel complex did not
require the newly incorporated City of Solana Beach to allow the development. The Commis-
sion held that the city's interim building moratorium aimed at such development did not re-
quire Commission approval through the LCP review process and did not conflict with the
Commission's pre-incorporation issuance of a development permit. See Memorandum from
Ralph Faust, California Coastal Commission Chief Counsel, and Mary L. Hudson and Jane
McCoy, Staff Counsel, to Commissioners and Interested Persons (Sept. 10, 1986) ("Commis-
sion Jurisdiction in Respect to Enactment of Local Moratoria") (on file at The Hastings Law
Journal ).
56. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30101 (West 1986). In contrast, "coastal-related" uses are to
be sited "[w]hen appropriate" and "should be accommodated within reasonable proximity to
the coastal-dependent uses they support." Id. § 30255.
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dent uses."57
Since the phrase "onshore support facilities" encompasses a variety
of activities, only some of which may be considered coastal-dependent, it
is possible that sections of these ordinances could be upheld and others
rejected.58 While the statute classifies offshore oil and gas development
as a coastal-dependent activity, it is not certain whether this coastal-de-
pendent status extends to crude oil pipelines, storage facilities, oil and gas
separation facilities, refineries, port facilities, or the other uses described
in the local ordinances. For example, because pipelines and harbor facili-
ties must by their nature be sited on, or adjacent to, the sea to function at
all, they are likely to be considered coastal-dependent. By contrast, stor-
age facilities59 and refineries60 generally have not been considered
coastal-dependent. Since pipelines and port facilities are likely to be
considered coastal-dependent, the ordinances specifying an outright ban
on these facilities potentially conflict with the three-prong test of section
30260.
If the Commission views section 30260 as requiring the siting of
these facilities, it could take two different approaches: (1) reject the entire
ordinance outright, or (2) look to the locality's particular situation to
determine whether such a conflict actually exists. Under the latter ap-
proach, the Commission would need to determine whether energy com-
panies anticipate the development of onshore support facilities and
whether such facilities could in fact be sited under section 30260. The
approach would vary from locality to locality depending upon whether
mineral deposits have been located offshore and whether there are plans
to develop those deposits. If offshore development is anticipated, the
Commission could still allow the locality to show alternatives that are
not environmentally damaging and that will accommodate the offshore
development using facilities outside the county. If the Commission
57. See COASTAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, supra note 43, at 14; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 30001.2, 30411 (West 1986).
58. See, e.g., County of San Mateo Measure B, supra note 13, § 3, pt. 4.23, which
"[djefine[s] onshore facilities for offshore oil as temporary or permanent service bases, includ-
ing but not limited to warehouse, open storage or stockpiling areas, offices, communication
centers, harbor or wharf development or improvement, parking and helipad areas, processing
plants and storage tanks."
59. California Coastal Commission, Revised Conditions and Findings in Coastal Devel-
opment Permit Application of Port of Los Angeles and Pacific Texas Pipeline Co., Application
No. 5-85-623 (Oct. 7, 1986) at 10-11, 14.
60. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE § 30263 (West 1986). Section 30263 provides similar require-
ments for new or expanded refineries or petrochemical facilities to those applied to coastal-
dependent industrial development, but adds the requirements that the facility must not be
"located in a highly scenic or seismically hazardous area .... or within or contiguous to
environmentally sensitive areas" and that it be sited so as to "provide a sufficient buffer area to
minimize adverse impacts on surrounding property." This provision seems to provide refin-
eries with a hybrid coastal-related status, thereby subject to more stringent siting requirements
than coastal-dependent facilities.
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agrees with the locality's alternatives analysis, it might approve a flat
moratorium on onshore development.
In making this determination, the Commission must initially con-
sider whether the use of alternative locations is infeasible-that is, unable
to be successfully accomplished within a reasonable period of time, tak-
ing into account economic, environmental, social, and technological fac-
tors61-- or whether their use would be more environmentally damaging.
As an alternative to pipelines, refineries, and storage facilities, an offshore
tanker arrangement could transport crude oil to existing refineries. How-
ever, such a tanker system may not only be more costly to the energy
companies but may pose greater environmental risks through the in-
creased possibilities of oil spills and tanker accidents on route to refin-
eries.62 Offshore tanker facilities may also pose air pollution problems
through increased release of hydrocarbons. 63
Consequently, in balancing the economic and environmental costs of
an offshore tanker system, the Commission could conclude that alterna-
tive facilities are not feasible. In such a scenario, it is likely that an on-
shore facility would be considered in the public welfare,64 and all that
would be required is that environmental effects be mitigated to the maxi-
mum extent feasible. Thus, even under this localized approach, adher-
ence to a mandatory siting interpretation of the Act might lead to
rejection of a county LCP flatly banning all onshore support facilities.
The third variable in the Commission's decision making process dif-
ferentiates between the moratorium and voter referendum ordinance ap-
proaches. Consideration of the voter referendum model requires a similar
but slightly different analysis. In the case of referenda the Commission
must decide whether the voters' potential power to reject a facility that is
otherwise consistent with the state Coastal Act presents a direct conflict
with the Act's energy siting provisions. If the Commission adopts a
mandatory siting interpretation of the Coastal Act, rejection of the refer-
enda is possible.
However, a local board of supervisors already make the initial siting
decisions and they also presently have the power to reject the siting of
61. See supra note 52.
62. See Exxon Seeks Overturn of California Decision Banning Offshore Processing Facility
Expansion, [17 Current Development] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 975 (Oct. 24, 1986) (dis-
cussing California Coastal Commission consistency review for Exxon Santa Ynez Offshore
Unit).
63. Id.
64. The Commission's standard is very vague. See CALIFORNIA COASTAL MANAGE-
MENT PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 66 ("In making such a finding, the Commission considen
the State and national public welfare as expressed in appropriate legislation, policy statements
and documents on energy policy."). See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 13666.4 (1982) ("disap
proval would adversely affect the public welfare as defined in the findings, declarations, an(
general provisions of the Coastal Act... and the California Coastal Management Program, i
applicable.").
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
ONSHORE SUPPORT FACILITIES INITIATIVES
facilities that are otherwise consistent with the Coastal Act siting provi-
sions. Because the referenda only transfer that power to the voters, it
would seem that referenda impose changes that are wholly procedural
rather than substantive in nature. In effect, the referenda allow local rep-
resentatives to defer to the people on an issue that is already left, under
the Coastal Act, to the initial consideration of a local jurisdiction. Ac-
cordingly, the Commission may well adopt a wait and see approach as to
the potentially conflicting use of the voter referendum or may simply
consider the measures as insignificant procedural changes. In any case,
the Commission could then approve the referendum model.
The fourth and potentially most important variable is the Commis-
sion's use of its override power over local decisions not to site major
energy facilities. Section 30515 allows the Coastal Commission, in cer-
tain circumstances, to override a local government's decision not to site a
major energy facility. This provision specifically provides that
[a]ny person ... proposing an energy facility development may request
any local government to amend its certified local coastal program, if
the purpose of the proposed amendment is to meet public needs of an
area greater than that included within such certified [LCP] that had not
been anticipated by the person making the request at the time the
[LCP] was before the commission for certification. If, after review, the
local government determines that the amendment requested would be
in conformity with the policies of this division, it may amend its certi-
fied [LCP] as provided in section 30514. If the local government does
not amend its [LCPJ, such person may file with the Commission a re-
quest for amendment.... The commission may... approve and certify
the proposed amendment if itfinds, after a careful balancing of social,
economic, and environmental effects, that to do otherwise would ad-
versely affect the public welfare, that a public need of an area greater
than that included within the certified [LCP] would be met, that there is
no feasible, less environmentally damaging alternative way to meet such
need, and that the proposed amendment is in conformity with the poli-
cies of this division.65
Under Section 30515, the Coastal Commission retains the power to over-
ride a local government and amend its LCP to allow the siting of onshore
facilities, despite any local LCP banning such facilities. Before the Com-
mission may execute its override power, it must meet two important pre-
conditions. 66 First, the facilities must meet the "public needs" of an area
larger than the particular locality. Offshore energy development serves
both state and national energy needs and consequently would fulfill this
condition. The second condition-that the purpose of the amendment is
65. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30515 (West 1986) (emphasis added). Section 30107 of the
Act defines energy facility as "any public or private processing, producing, generating, trans-
mitting or recovering facility for electricity, natural gas, petroleum, coal or other source of
energy." Id. § 30107.
66. Id. § 30515.
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to meet public needs unanticipated at the time of the certification of the
original LCP-presents a greater limitation on the Commission's over-
ride authority. This requirement seems relatively flexible. For example,
an energy company need only show that the necessity for onshore facili-
ties is the result of greater offshore development than was anticipated, in
response to growing public energy demands.
While the statute does not require the Commission to consider the
override provision when reviewing LCP amendments, these provisions
are nonetheless likely to influence the Commission's decision making
process since the override is an important check on local siting deci-
sions.67 Given the Commission's ultimate override power, approval of
the referendum ordinances seems probable. While less probable, the
moratorium ordinances could also be approved by the Commission.
Political considerations may greatly influence the Commission's de-
termination of these issues. The Commission generally shares with the
local governments the concern over the threats posed by offshore devel-
opment. 68 Given its ultimate override authority, the Commission may
approve these ordinances as amendments to the local governments'
LCPs. However, given the wide range of political views represented on
the Commission, it is exceedingly difficult to predict the outcome on the
67. See County of Sonoma Measure A, supra note 13, § 30-2(f):
[W]hen balanced against the dramatic impacts of [offshore energy development, the
referendum process is reasonably calculated to address local concerns while not un-
duly interfering with federal and state energy objectives. This is especially true in light
of the local override procedure set forth in section 30515 of the Coastal Act.
(Emphasis added).
68. Although Republican Governor George Deukmejian's appointments have tempered
the Coastal Commission's conservationist bent, the Democratic Speaker of the Assembly and
the Senate Rules Committee each appoint two members to the Commission. See CAL. PUB.
REs. CODE § 30301 (West 1986). Observers of the Commission place the conservation lean-
ings of the current Commissioners into three categories: (1) those who fundamentally oppose
OCS development; (2) those who will allow such development to occur with sufficient environ-
mental safeguards; and (3) those who strongly favor OCS development. See CALIFORNIA
COASTAL COMM'N, COMMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR ON THE PROPOSED
FIVE-YEAR OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM 1 (Apr. 10, 1986). It provides:
The Commission opposes proceeding with the Proposed Five-Year Oil and Gas Leas-
ing Program at this time because subsequent lease sales will result in unacceptable
impacts on coastal resources. The Commission believes that such activities pose un-
acceptable risks of oil spills, visual and air quality degradation, marine resource im-
pacts and conflicts between the commercial fishing and tourism industries and
petroleum operations. Further, the lack of an overall comprehensive energy policy
precludes rational planning for such lease sales and the absence of an adequate [Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement] for the Five-Year Planning Program does not allow for
a complete assessment of the effects such a program will have on the coastal zone.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Hurley, Politics and Pro-development Bias Plague California
Coastal Commission, Sierra Club Yodeler, Mar. 1987, at 4 col. 3 (citing Natural Resources
Defense Council study of the voting records of Coastal Commissioners).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
ONSHORE SUPPORT FACILITIES INITIATIVES
particularly sensitive political issues involved in the consideration of
these measures.
In summary, the Coastal Commission must initially consider
whether the ordinances are amendments of the locality's LCP. Given the
broad scope of LCPs in general, it is very likely that the Commission will
determine that both moratoria and referenda ordinances constitute
amendments of the LCP.69 Having made that determination, the Com-
mission must consider whether the ordinances are consistent with the
Coastal Act. To resolve this issue, the ordinances must be compared to
the coastal-dependent industrial siting provisions which allow such de-
velopment if alternative locations are infeasible, the facility is in the pub-
lic welfare, and adverse environmental impacts are mitigated to the
maximum extent possible. The outcome of this comparison depends,
first, upon the treatment the Commission gives to the referendum or
moratorium approach and, second, upon whether the Commission con-
siders the siting provisions of section 30260 as requiring the approval of
facilities that meet its statutory criteria or as simply giving local govern-
ments the option to site facilities that otherwise would violate the general
provisions of Chapter Three. Given the Coastal Commission's override
authority for energy facilities and the seemingly nonmandatory language
of section 30260, the Commission should legally approve the ordinances
as consistent with the Coastal Act. Once approved by the Coastal Com-
mission, these ordinances are effective under California law and enforcea-
ble by the locality as part of its LCP.70 However, to be approved
pursuant to the federal CMZA, the Department of Commerce must con-
sider the ordinances' effect on the state's coastal management program.
B. Consideration at the Federal Level: the Federal Coastal Zone
Management Act
Once an onshore support facility ordinance is approved by the state
Coastal Commission, its treatment under the federal CZMA depends on
whether it is regarded as an amendment to the state's coastal program or
as a routine program implementation. The Secretary of Commerce (Sec-
retary) must review amendments to ensure consistency with the federal
CZMA.71 However, the Secretary need not review a routine program
69. See supra notes 32, 45 and accompanying text.
70. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30515(a) (West 1986). There are dangers in enforcing an
LCP provision before it is approved by the federal Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Man-
agement. See, e.g, Save Our Dunes v. Leigh Pegues, 642 F. Supp. 393, 407 (M.D. Ala. 1985)
(court enjoined further issuance of coastal development permits by Alabama until OCRM had
reviewed its coastal plan amendment and determined whether an environmental impact state-
ment was required).
71. NOAA Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 923.82 (1986). The Secretary of Commerce has del-
egated his review authority to the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resources Management within
the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
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implementation that is consistent with the state's approved program.72
The NOAA regulations define amendments as
substantial changes in, or substantial changes to enforceable policies or
authorities related to:
1) Boundaries;
2) Uses subject to the management program;
3) Criteria or procedures for designating or managing areas or partic-
ular concern or areas for preservation or restoration; and
4) Consideration of the national interest in the planning for and in the
siting of, facilities which are necessary to meet requirements which are
other than local in nature.73
The Coastal Commission would likely argue that because the ordinance
does not affect the energy facility override contained in section 30515 of
the California Coastal Act, no substantial change has been made in the
state energy siting provisions. Under such an analysis, the onshore sup-
port facility ordinances would arguably only be routine program imple-
mentation actions not requiring federal approval.
It is unlikely, however, that the Secretary would accept this reason-
ing. The comments to the regulations governing amendments to state
programs make clear that "[s]ubsequent changes to local programs that
result in any changes contained in section 923.80(c) [which includes con-
sideration of the national interest in energy facility siting] will be treated
as amendments. ' 74 On this basis, the Secretary could conclude that, re-
gardless of the state override provisions, the ordinance represents a sig-
nificant change in the local program's energy siting provisions and the
sufficiency of the local government's consideration of the national
interest.75
If the Secretary views the ordinances as state coastal program
amendments, he must then determine whether the state's amended man-
agement program still constitutes an approvable program under the
CZMA. 76 This review would include a determination of consistency
with the national interest provisions. 77 As noted in the previous discus-
sion of the national interest provisions, 78 the Secretary's principal in-
quiry is whether the state has considered the national interest in making
72. Id. § 923.84.
73. Id. § 923.80(c)(1-4) (emphasis added).
74. Id. § 923.80(c); see 44 Fed. Reg. 18,594 (1979).
75. For example, the regulations require that the state management plan "[d]escribe the
process for continued consideration of the national interest... including a clear and detailed
description of the administrative procedures and decisions points where such interest will be
considered." 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(c)(4) (1986). Since the ordinances change the procedures of
local consideration and arguably may remove consideration of the national interest from deci-
sion making at the local level, they amend the current program.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 923.52.
78. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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energy facility siting decisions.79 The onshore support facility ordinances
raise the question of whether they provide for an adequate consideration
of more than local interests. A blanket prohibition of all future onshore
support facilities, initiated by local voters, would seemingly prevent fu-
ture consideration of the national interest in a future facility proposal.
Moreover, very few of these local ordinances include any mention either
of the national or the state energy needs that are generally cited as the
primary justification for offshore mineral development.8 0 As a result, the
Secretary may conclude that the local government has failed to consider
the national interest in the siting of these facilities. 8 '
Whether such a determination requires a rejection of the amend-
ment depends upon the Secretary's interpretation of the state override
provision. Neither the statute nor the regulations require that the na-
tional interest be considered at every possible level of decision making.
As a result, the Secretary acting within his discretion, could conclude
that the state override provision of the Coastal Act guarantees an ade-
quate consideration of the national interest since the Coastal Commission
can override a locality's onshore facilities ban and site a major energy
facility. Thus, the Secretary could conclude that the California Coastal
Commission already protects the national interest in energy facilities
through its override and that any change in national interest considera-
tion at the local level would not weaken this protection.
Political considerations, however, such as the Reagan Administra-
tion's offshore leasing policies and the perceived ideological bent of the
state Coastal Commission, will likely influence the Secretary's determina-
tion. For example, if the administration favored a pro-OCS development
policy, the Secretary would probably not rely on a state override held by
a conservation-minded state coastal commission.
The Reagan Administration has consistently sought greatly ex-
panded offshore energy development along the California coast.82 More-
over, recent actions by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource
79. See 15 C.F.R.§ 923.82(a)(l)(v)(A)-(D) (1986).
80. The striking exception is the County of Sonoma, Cal., measure which includes a de-
tailed discussion of the county's status as a net exporter of energy:
Sonoma County is already a net exporter of energy and thus has met and will con-
tinue to meet its burden to contribute to the production of area-wide, state and na-
tional energy needs. Because of the existing level of this contribution and the fact that
the field life of [the] geothermal plants [located in the County] is from 30 to 50 years,
the development of the Sonoma County coast for oil and gas production should not
be accomplished in the name of regional, state or national energy needs.
Sonoma County Measure A, supra note 13, at §§ 30-2(d) to 30-2(e) (includes a discussion of
the need for a national energy policy); see also Monterey County Measure A, supra note 12, at
16.55.010 ("Rather than consuming offshore oil and gas resources now, our nation should
conserve these resources, since they are nonrenewable.").
81. See 15 C.F.R. § 923.52(c) (1986).
82. See, eg., OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 2.
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Management (OCRM), which acts as the delegate of the Secretary in
these matters, indicate its disapproval of local LCPs that contain lan-
guage opposing federal offshore development. In its recent consideration
of an LCP amendment proposed by Crescent City, California involving
future expansion of the city's port to accommodate offshore develop-
ment, OCRM struck out language that suggested the OCS off northern
California be made a National Marine Sanctuary. 83 OCRM approved
the LCP after removing the objectionable language. 84 This action not
only demonstrates future political problems for LCPs banning onshore
support facilities, but also raises legal questions concerning whether the
OCRM can edit language from an LCP and then approve the edited
plan. A literal reading of the Act and NOAA regulations suggests that
OCRM must either approve in total or reject an LCP amendment as
inconsistent with CZMA.85
In view of the Secretary's discretion in reviewing LCP amend-
ments86 and the Reagan Administration's pro-offshore leasing policies,
83. Letter from Peter Tweedt, Director of Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Manage-
ment to Peter Douglas, Executive Director of California Coastal Commission (Apr. 14, 1986)
(on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
84. Id.
85. See 15 C.F.R. § 923.82 (1986). Section 923.84 provides for a voluntary mediation of
"serious disagreements" between the state and a federal agency. However, neither of these
regulations gives OCRM the authority to conditionally approve an LCP amendment. The U.S.
Justice Department dismissed a suit claiming that a similar conditional approval by the State
of New Jersey was contrary to CZMA's federal consistency review provisions. See Chemical
Waste Mgmt. v. United States Dept. of Commerce (D.D.C. No. 86-624) (1986).
A more fundamental question, because of the procedural interpretation given the national
interest siting provisions, is whether OCRM can legitimately interject its views into the sub-
stance of a LCP. See Letter from Peter Douglas, Executive Director of the California Coastal
Commission, to Peter Tweedt, Director, Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management
(Mar. 28, 1986) (requesting reconsideration of the Crescent City LCP decision) (on file at The
Hastings Law Journal). Given the procedural interpretation of the national interest provisions
and the previously accepted protections of the state override provision, this author believes
that OCRM cannot interject its own substantive views into a LCP. See, e.g., Save Our Dunes v.
Leigh Pegues, 647 F. Supp. 393, 401 (M.D. Ala. 1985). The federal district court held:
CZMA was not intended to provide a system by which federal officials would directly
regulate and control a state's coastal zone. With the exception of land subject to
exclusive federal control, the Act does not vest the federal government with ultimate
power to control environmental activities along the coast. Rather, the Act is more
procedural in nature, requiring that states make 'conscious and informal [sic] choices
among the various alternatives' through the development of coastal zone manage-
ment programs.
See also American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 609 F.2d 1306, 1313-15 (9th Cir. 1979) (uphold-
ing procedural interpretation of CZMA national interest provision).
86. OCRM has recently sought to change the process by which it reviews changes in
LCPs. OCRM now processes routine program implementation (RPI) changes in the same
manner as program amendments. Thus, each RPI is analyzed for consistency with CZMA
policies and standards. See Letter from Peter Tweedt, Executive Director of Office of Ocean
and Coastal Resource Management, to Agency Heads, State Coastal Program Managers (Feb.
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the ordinances banning onshore facilities are likely to either be rejected
or modified. The voter referendum ordinances do not on their face, how-
ever, ban onshore facilities. Consequently, although still unlikely, the
voter referendum ordinances may have a better chance of approval than
do the outright onshore facility bans.
In conclusion, if the Secretary of Commerce either considers the or-
dinances as simply routine program implementations or approves them
as state coastal plan amendments, the ordinances will be given effect
under the CZMA.87 If the Secretary considers the ordinances amend-
ments and rejects them, 88 then the ordinances will not be given effect
under the CZMA. The enforceability of ordinances rejected as amend-
ments under the the CZMA will be considered in the following sections.
Section IC considers the consequences of an ordinance's approval under
the CZMA.
C. The Consequences of Federal Approval of a State Coastal Program
Amendment Under the Coastal Zone Management Act
Although approval of a state program under the CZMA does not
insulate its provisions from a preemption challenge on the basis of a con-
flict with federal law,89 federal approval of the program brings with it
18, 1986) ("Program Change Guidance Update") (on file at The Hastings Law Journal). Ac-
cording to the current regulations, only amendments to a state's program need be evaluated
against CZMA. 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.81-.82 & .84 (1986). RPI, by definition, is merely implemen-
tation of policy elements of the state program which have already been approved as consistent
with the CZMA. Consequently, the standard of review is the state program. This recent "re-
interpretation" by OCRM has been greatly criticized by the states who participate in the
CZMA. See Nautilus: Coastal Resource Management, Sept. 26, 1986, at 5-6. OCRM is cur-
rently in the process of promulgating new regulations governing program changes.
87. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.80, 923.84 (1986).
88. Id. § 923.83(a). This section provides that "mediation is available to states or federal
agencies when a serious disagreement regarding a proposed amendment arises."
89. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C-75-648-M, at 5-6. (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24,
1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nora. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 180
(1978). In support of its supertanker ban in the Puget Sound, the state argued that the Com-
merce Department's approval of its coastal management plan "somehow waives federal pre-
emption in the area." In rejecting the argument, the court noted that the Secretary can only
approve a state plan if "the views of Federal agencies principally affected by such program
have been adequately considered," and concluded "[t]he Secretary may or may not have no-
ticed the preemptive affect of the [Ports and Waterway Safety Act] on Washington's Tanker
Law. That is not before us. We cannot read the Secretary's approval of the coastal zone
management plan, to which the Tanker law is only collaterally related, as foreclosing our
inquiry into the federal preemption of oil tanker regulation." See also 15 C.F.R. § 930.32(a)
(1986). CZMA's consistency provisions require federal agency compliance "unless compliance
is prohibited based upon the requirements of existing law applicable to the Federal agency's
operations." Id. This regulation supports the interpretation that a state provision approved
under the CZMA still must undergo a preemption analysis. But see Southern Pac. Transporta-
tion Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 520 F. Supp. 800, 804 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (jurisdiction of
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potential protection from a constitutional attack under the commerce
clause and federal consistency review under the CZMA.
Courts have interpreted the Secretary of Commerce's approval of a
state coastal management program as manifesting "congressional con-
sent" to the state program. A federal district court in Norfolk Southern
Corp. v. Oberly9° rejected a commerce clause attack on the Delaware
Coastal Zone Act on the ground that the Secretary's approval of the pro-
gram manifested congressional consent to the program's ban on the sit-
ing of new heavy industry in the state coastal zone.91 The Norfolk
Southern Corporation had sought to invalidate the heavy industry ban,
arguing that it unduly burdened interstate commerce and was therefore
void under a dormant commerce clause analysis. 92 The court rejected
this challenge using the following reasoning:
In enacting the CZMA Congress was acting, in part, pursuant to its
constitutional power under the Commerce Clause. The CZMA thus
embodies a congressional exercise of the Commerce Clause power
translated into a set of congressionally mandated policies over the
coastal zone. Congress funds only those plans that comport with the
national interest, and therefore requires the Secretary of Commerce to
approve state plans.... Based upon the regulations and the Secretary's
periodic approval of the Delaware plan, the requirement of express
congressional consent is met.... The Delaware [Coastal Zone Act] is
therefore immune from plaintiffs' challenge under the Commerce
Clause .... 93
If a court adopts this analysis, the Secretary's approval of an ordinance
pursuant to CZMA will eliminate any potential attack on the ordinance
as violating the dormant commerce clause.
Another advantage of the Secretary's approval of a state manage-
ment program centers on the CZMA consistency provisions governing
federal activities. The consistency provisions require federal activities or
federal permits and licenses affecting the coastal zone to conform with
the state's coastal program.94 While the United States Supreme Court in
Coastal Commission over abandonments pursuant to CZMA not preempted or repealed by the
revised Interstate Commerce Act).
90. 632 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Del. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-5322 (3rd Cir. argued Feb.
9, 1987).
91. Id. at 1243.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1250-52. It should be noted that the court was not faced with a state coastal
plan that directly conflicted with another federal statute as was the Supreme Court in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151 (1978). See Rubin, supra note 28, at 420 n. 83; but see Brief for
the United States Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae, Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F.
Supp. 1225 (D. Del. 1986) (No. 84-330) (The U.S. Department of Justice argued that neither
CZMA itself nor approval by the Department of Commerce removes the commerce clause
restraints on state law.), appeal docketed, No. 86-5322 (3rd Cir. argued Feb. 9, 1987).
94. It is important to note that the California Coastal Commission uses the Coastal Act
as its basis of review, not the locality's LCP provisions, when it reviews a federal consistency
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Secretary of Interior v. California95 concluded that consistency review did
not extend to offshore leasing,96 the consistency provisions of section
307(c)(3)(B) expressly require that offshore mineral exploration, develop-
ment, and production conform with the state's coastal program. Under
the offshore development consistency provision, if a state objects to the
proposed federal activity on the ground that it is inconsistent with the
state's management program, the federal government will not issue a per-
mit or license for the offshore activity unless the Secretary decides to
override the state's objection. 97
determination concluding that a federal activity conforms with the State Plan. For example,
when reviewing the Secretary of Interior's determination that an offshore drilling rig off
County X is consistent with California's Coastal Management Program, the Coastal Commis-
sion would not use the LCP of County X which bans onshore support facilities as the standard
of review. The Commission would instead review the rig proposal in terms of the California
Coastal Act and County X's LCP would merely be advisory. See Letter from Peter Douglas,
Executive Director of the California Coastal Commission, to Peter Tweed, Director, Office of
Coastal Resource Management, at 4 (Mar. 28, 1986) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal); see
also 15 C.F.R. § 930.39(c) (1987) (federal agencies must only give adequate consideration to
management provisions which are in the nature of recommendations); 15 C.F.R.
§ 930.58(a)(4) (1987) (applicants need only demonstrate adequate consideration of policies
which are in the nature of recommendations).
95. 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
96. There are three consistency review provisions in the CZMA. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1),
which corresponds to § 307(c)(1) of the Act, applies to federal activities that "directly affect" a
state's coastal zone and requires that those federal activities be consistent with the state pro-
grams "to the maximum extent practicable." The second consistency provision, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1456(c)(3)(A), which corresponds to § 307(c)(3)(A) of the Act, applies to nongovernmental
applicants for federal licenses or permits to conduct activities affecting a state's coastal zone.
Applicants for such licenses or permits must certify that their activities will be conducted in a
manner consistent with state management programs. If a state disagrees with the certification
of consistency, the federal government will deny the application unless the Secretary of Com-
merce overrides the state's objection. Congress in 1976 amended CZMA to add a third consis-
tency provision to reinforce the state's power to influence OCS development. This new
provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B), which corresponds to § 307(c)(3)(B) of the Act, requires
OCS lessees to certify that any development, exploration, or production will be consistent with
the affected state management program. The Supreme Court in Secretary of Interior v. Cali-
fornia concluded that the absence of the word "lease" in this scheme manifested Congress'
intent that OCS lease sales were also not included in the consistency review provision of 16
U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A). 464 U.S. at 336-40. That decision has been greatly criticized by a
number of commentators. See supra note 7.
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1986). The Secretary can override the state's objection if
he finds the activity "is consistent with the objectives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise necessary
in the interest of national security." Id. See also NOAA Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120-
.134 (1986). Section 930.121 provides:
The term 'consistent with the objectives or purposes of the Act' describes a Federal
license or permit activity.., which, although inconsistent with a State's management
program, is found by the Secretary to be permissible because it satisfies the following
four requirements: (a) The activity furthers one or more of the competing national
objectives or purposes contained in sections 302 or 303 of the Act [which cite the
need for priority consideration for coastal dependent uses and orderly processes for
the siting of major energy facilities], (b) When performed separately or when its cu-
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The OCSLA specifically requires that a lessee submit a development
and production plan that is
accompanied by a statement describing all facilities and operations,
other than those on the outer Continental Shelf, proposed by the lessee
and known by him (whether or not owned or operated by such lessee)
which will be constructed or utilized in the development and produc-
tion of oil or gas from the lease area, including the location and site of
such facilities and operations, the land, labor, material, and energy re-
quirements associated with such facilities and operations, and all envi-
ronmental and safety safeguards to be implemented.98
However, since these plans for onshore support facilities are not an ac-
tual part of the development and production plan approved by the Secre-
tary of Interior, they are not part of the federal consistency review
process. 99 Rather, the energy companies must apply directly to the local
governments for development approval and may be able to appeal a local
denial to the Coastal Commission under section 30515.
In sum, should the Secretary approve the ordinances as consistent
with the CZMA, there is judicial authority providing the ordinances im-
munity from a dormant commerce clause attack. 100 The ordinances
must, however, still overcome a preemption challenge on the ground that
they conflict with the OCSLA, which authorizes mineral development on
the federal OCS. Section III discusses this possible preemption chal-
lenge. Before that discussion, however, the Note takes a brief look at the
potential consequences if the ordinances are rejected as inconsistent with
the CZMA.
D. Consequences of Federal Rejection of a State Coastal Program
Amendment Under the Coastal Zone Management Act
If the Secretary refuses to approve an ordinance as a state program
mulative effects are considered, it will not cause adverse effects on the natural re-
sources of the coastal zone enough to outweigh its contribution to the national
interest, (c) The activity will not violate any requirements of the Clean Air Act, as
amended, or the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, and (d) There is
no reasonable alternative available (e.g., location design, etc.) which would permit
the activity to be concluded in a manner consistent with the management program.
15 C.F.R. § 930.121 (1986). Section 930.122 states, "The term 'necessary in the interest of
national security' describes a Federal license or permit activity... which ... is found by the
Secretary to be permissible because a national defense or other national security interest would
be significantly impaired if the activity were not permitted to go forward as proposed." Id.
§ 930.122.
98. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(2) (1986) (emphasis added).
99. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1474, 95 Cong., 2nd Sess. 116-17, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1714-16 (Development and production "plan itself is only to
cover OCS facilities and operation, including pipelines, and not facilities and operations in
State waters.").
100. See Norkfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Del. 1986), appeal docketed,
No. 86-5322 (3rd Cir. argued Feb. 9, 1987); see also supra text accompanying note 91.
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amendment, the state may seek to enforce its onshore zoning laws
outside of the CZMA framework. While CZMA is a voluntary program
and therefore not a preemptive exercise of the commerce power,101 a
state may run the risk of either losing or reducing its CZMA funding if it
seeks to enforce a provision inconsistent with the terms of the Act.'0 2 A
state also runs a more significant risk as a result of potential decertifica-
tion of its program: it may lose its consistency review authority over fed-
eral activities in the coastal zone. While California might be willing to
give up its two million dollars in federal CZMA funding to prevent unde-
101. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1430-31 (1987);
SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, COASTAL MANAGEMENT ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S.
REP. 92-753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4776, 4776. The Senate Report states:
[T]hrough the system of providing grants-in-aid, the States are provided financial
incentives to undertake the responsibility for setting up management programs in the
coastal zone. There is no attempt to diminish state authority through Federal preemp-
tion. The intent of this legislation is to enhance State authority by encouraging and
assisting the States to assume planning and regulatory powers over their coastal zones.
Id. (emphasis added); Breeden, supra note 2, at 1147-48. Breeden states:
[I]n particular, the power to override it [state coastal regulation which the CZMA]
gives the Secretary of Commerce should be understood not as a preemption of state
control, but as a device to provide relief in extraordinary cases from a general con-
gressional intention that state-determined priorities should prevail over federal poli-
cies for the coastal region. There are several reasons for this interpretation. First,
the provision is only applicable to states that have voluntarily participated in the
coastal zone management program. Had Congress concluded that there was a need
for federal preemption of the siting of OCS-related facilities, it presumably would
have extended the Secretary's power to override to all states, not just those that chose
to join the CZMA program. Second, if participation in the CZMA scheme subjected
states to preemption, many might refrain from developing coastal plans under the
CZMA - exactly opposite the result that Congress intended.
102. Under 16 U.S.C. 1458(c) (1986), the Secretary may reduce program administration
funding by up to 30% if she determines that the coastal state is failing to make significant
improvement in achieving coastal management objectives specified in § 1452(2)(A) through
1452(2)(C). Section 1452(2)(C) provides that "priority consideration [be] given to coastal-de-
pendent uses and orderly processes for siting major facilities related to... energy." Id. This
provision was recently amended in the 1985 Coastal Zone Management Reauthorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 6043(a), 100 Stat. 124 (1985).
The district court in American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, noting a provision in the
special Energy Impact Program of CZMA, stated that:
[t]he Congress was particularly careful to circumscribe the role of the federal govern-
ment in particular siting decisions. Thus, § 308(i) provides: The Secretary shall not
intercede in any land use or water use decision of any coastal state with respect to the
siting of any energy facility or public facility by making siting in a particular location
a prerequisite to, or a condition of financial assistance under this section.
456 F. Supp 889, 923 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (emphasis added).
In 1986, California received approximately $2 million in federal administrative support
funding under CZMA. However, under the OCS revenue sharing program California received
$338 million, which is not dependent on the state's compliance with CZMA. See infra note
125. This money, although not presently targeted to the California Coastal Commission, could
more than make up for lost CZMA administrative funding.
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sirable coastal industrial development, it may not be willing to risk the
potential loss of its consistency review authority under the CZMA. Pres-
ently, the consistency review provisions are California's principal avenue
of affecting activities on the federal OCS. Consistency review is generally
an important source of state input into federal decision making through-
out the coastal zone.
The Secretary of Commerce makes the key determination of
whether a state's enforcement of an inconsistent LCP provision is suffi-
cient grounds to decertify the state's coastal management program,
thereby depriving the state of consistency review authority over federal
activities. Under section 1458(d), the Secretary must withdraw approval
and funding of a state program "if the Secretary determines that the
coastal state is failing to adhere to, is not justified in deviating from...
the management program approved by the Secretary ... and refuses to
remedy the deviation." 10 3 To date, the Secretary has never decertified a
state coastal program. It is therefore unclear to what extent a state could
deviate from its approved program before the Secretary would decertify
the program. To justify decertification, the Secretary would need to
point to specific actions by a state or local government in conflict with its
approved program 104 For example, the Secretary would have to bring
forth specific evidence showing that a local government had rejected sit-
ing of energy facilities that should have been sited under their LCP's
previous siting provisions. The Secretary could then argue that the local
government, by rejecting siting of those facilities, was in actuality enforc-
ing the federally rejected moratorium ordinance.
In summary, while the potential loss of consistency review authority
makes decertification extremely threatening to a state, the chances of the
Secretary decertifying the state's coastal program seem remote. Further-
more, even if the Secretary interprets a state action as deviating from its
approved program, the Secretary may decertify the program only after
the state has had an opportunity to remedy its noncompliance.10 5 This
provision gives the state time to challenge the Secretary's determination
in court, if necessary, or to capitulate and remove the objectionable pro-
visions from the LCP. Nevertheless, given the present state of confronta-
tion between the federal government and the State of California over the
impact of offshore energy development, the potential threat of decertifi-
cation remains a very serious one. Consequently, the state Coastal Com-
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(d) (1985).
104. Cf Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-20 (1971) (Court
held that the Administrator of Transporation needed to provide an adequate explanation of his
discretionary approval of a highway in order to allow the lower court to "consider whether the
decision was based upon a consideration of relevant factors and whether there ha[d] been a
clear error ofjudgment.").
105. Id.
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mission may be reluctant to allow a locality to enforce provisions that the
Secretary has determined to be inconsistent with the CZMA.
Should the state or local government nonetheless decide to enforce
the onshore support facility ordinances outside the CZMA framework,
the measures' enforceability depends upon overcoming two additional
hurdles. First, as with an approved program under the CZMA, the ordi-
nances must survive potential federal preemption by the OCSLA-the
federal statute authorizing OCS mineral leasing and development. If the
ordinances are not preempted, they must then meet and overcome the
final hurdle: constitutional muster under the commerce clause.10 6
II. The Preemption Challenge by the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act
By disrupting or perhaps even making mineral development on the
federal OCS impossible, the onshore support facility ordinances may im-
permissibly conflict with the federal OCSLA, which authorizes develop-
ment of the federal OCS. Resolution of the premption issue requires
examination of Congress' intent in adopting the OCSLA to determine
whether the Act (1) expressly preempts state regulation,10 7 (2) implicitly
prohibits local regulation of onshore facilities,10 8 or (3) directly conflicts
with the onshore support facility ordinances.10 9 The United States
Supreme Court has made clear that a court should "start with the as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not super-
seded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress." 10
In 1978, Congress amended the 1953 OCSLA in an attempt to fur-
ther two conflicting national needs. Congress wanted to expedite the de-
velopment of offshore energy sources to relieve national dependence on
106. See infra text accompanying notes 155-208.
107. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 11 (1983); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
108. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74
(1941).
109. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 106 S. Ct. 1103, 1116 (1986); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v.
Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1982).
110. See Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1982)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). See
generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975). The Note argues that "[c]umulatively considered, the
Burger Court decisions show a renewed emphasis on the state-directed doctrine." Id. at 649.
The "Burger Court's most recent decisions suggest that where Congress has not made clear its
intention to preempt, or where a conflict is unripe or peripheral to the purpose of the federal
statute, state legislation will be allowed to stand." Id. at 653.
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foreign energy sources"1 I and to provide for greater environmental pro-
tection1 12 and financial assistance to affected coastal areas. 1 3
Under the supremacy clause, it is well established that within consti-
tutional limits Congress may preempt state law by so stating in express
terms.' 1 4  The first step in determining whether the OCSLA expressly
preempts the onshore support facility ordinances involves looking to
Congress' specific intent concerning the onshore impacts of OCS develop-
ment. While section 1332 of the OCSLA specifically extends federal ju-
risdiction over the subsoil and seabed of the OCS seaward of the three
mile state waters, and provides for a detailed regulatory scheme gov-
erning mineral development operations on the OCS, 115 the Act contains
no specific provision for preempting state regulation of onshore facilities
supporting these OCS operations. Moreover, the statute does not ex-
pressly regulate these onshore facilities. The only reference to onshore
111. See 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1986). The congressional declaration of policy states: "[Tihe
outer Continental Shelf is a vital national resource reserve held by the Federal Government for
the public, which should be made available for expeditious and orderly development, subject to
environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of competi-
tion and other national needs." Id. § 1332(3).
112. Id. Section 1332(6) provides:
[O]perations in the outer Continental Shelf should be conducted in a safe manner by
well-trained personnel using technology, precautions, and techniques sufficient to
prevent or minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of well control, fires, spillages,
physical obstruction to other users of the waters or subsoil and seabed, or other oc-
currences which may cause damage to the environment or to property, or endanger
life or health.
(Emphasis added).
113. Id. Section 1332(4) provides:
[S]ince exploration, development, and production of the minerals of the outer Conti-
nental Shelf will have significant impacts on coastal and non-coastal areas of the
coastal States, and on other affected States, and, in recognition of the national inter-
est in the effective management of the marine, coastal, and human environments (A)
such States and their affected local governments may require assistance in protecting
their coastal zones and other affected areas from any temporary or permanent ad-
verse effects of such impacts; and (3) such States, and through such states, affected
local governments, are entitled to an opportunity to participate, to the extent consis-
tent with the national interest, in the policy and planning decisions made by the
Federal Government relating to exploration for, and development and production of,
minerals of the outer Continental Shelf.
See generally Jones, Mead & Sorenson, OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 19 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 885, 885-908 (1979); Krueger & Singer, Analysis of the OCS Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 909, 909-27 (1979); Note, OCS LandsAct Amendments
of 1978: Balancing Energy Needs with Environmental Concerns, 40 LA. L. REV. 177, 177-206
(1979).
114. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 14 (1983); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
115. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334-1440 (1986). See generally Annotation, Administration, and
Construction, under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et. seq.),
of Lease to Explore for Oil and Gas Deposits under Continental Shelf 31 A.L.R. FED. 615
(1977) (discussion of OCSLA leasing process).
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facilities in the federal scheme is a requirement that energy companies
submitting an oil and gas development and production plan to the Secre-
tary of the Interior include a separate description of "all facilities and
operations" not sited on the OCS.116 The House-Senate Conference
Committee Report on this provision makes explicit "that the plan itself is
only to cover OCS facilities and operations, including pipelines, and not
facilities and operations in state waters."' 17 Consequently, while the OC-
SLA grants the state consistency review over offshore facilities and oper-
ations that affect their coastal zone, the OCSLA specifically denies the
Secretary of Interior authority to review onshore support facilities or op-
erations in state waters as part of the development and production
plan.118
The Act's declaration of policy strengthens this interpretation:
"[T]he rights and responsibilities of all States and, where appropriate,
local governments, to preserve and protect their marine, human, and
coastal environments through such means as regulation of land, air, and
water uses, of safety, and of related development and activity should be
considered and recognized."'1 9 On the basis of this policy statement, a
court could easily conclude that Congress, even absent the CZMA con-
sistency provisions, 120 had within the OCSLA expressly reaffirmed the
power of state and local governments to make land use decisions pursu-
ant to their police power to protect their coastal areas from the adverse
affects of offshore development. If a court reaches the conclusion that
Congress had expressly affirmed state regulation of onshore support facil-
ities, the preemption analysis is complete. The likelihood of a court
reaching this conclusion depends in part upon the weight it gives the
language of the congressional statement of policy. While some courts
have given considerable effect to the general policy statements contained
in federal statutory schemes,' 21 others have maintained that congres-
sional consent must be more explicit.' 22 Under the latter approach, the
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (1986).
117. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116-17, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1715-16.
118. Id.
119. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(5) (1986) (emphasis added).
120. Id. § 1351 (cross reference to 16 U.S.C. § 1456). The consistency provisions provide
the state with review authority of these operations limited by the Secretary's national security
override.
121. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per
curiam without opinion, (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). The district court, rely-
ing on the Clean Air Act's general declaration of purpose in § 101 - "to protect and enhance"
the nation's air quality - required the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate regulations to
ensure that the quality of specified clean air regions did not deteriorate. The court reached this
conclusion even in the face of a complex scheme set forth in the Act that technically allowed
air pollution at greater national levels than in these clean air regions. Id. at 255.
122. See Association of Am. R.R. v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[a]
preamble no doubt contributes to a general understanding of a statute, but it is not an opera-
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court would then determine whether Congress had implicitly preempted
the ordinances.
The second test of preemption is whether the Act implies a congres-
sional intent to preempt state law from the legislative field. Courts have
found implied congressional intent to supersede state law in two different
ways. First, such intent can be implied from a "scheme of federal regula-
tion ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it.1 u 23 Second, courts have
inferred the requisite congressional intent when the matter is an issue
traditionally left to federal control.124
In light of the limited mention of onshore support facilities and the
express congressional exclusion of these facilities from OCS development
and production plans, a court using the first test may conclude that the
OCSLA does not manifest a regulatory scheme sufficient to be considered
pervasive. An oil company challenging the onshore regulation, however,
may argue that the Act's pervasive regulation is manifested by other pro-
visions: the fisherman's contingency fund, oil spill liability provisions, en-
vironmental and safety regulations concerning OCS operations, and the
CZMA energy impact funds. The oil companies would argue that these
regulations adequately address the local concerns behind the ordi-
nances.12 5 In response, the local governments would argue that onshore
land use decisions and other related problems constitute a separate "field
of concern" left by Congress to local regulation. The local governments
tive part of a statute, and does not enlarge or confer powers on administrative agencies or
officers"). See also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 773 (1983) ("preambles to
statutes do not impose substantive rights, duties or obligations"). But see Globe Fur Dyeing
Corp. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 179, 180 (1978) ("congressional purpose or declaration of
policy set out in the preamble of a statute provides a sound and thoroughly acceptable basis for
ascertaining the goals of the statute") (emphasis added), aff'd, 612 F.2d 586 (1980).
123. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
124. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 59 (1941); Napier v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1926); New York
Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 153 (1917); Charleston & W.C.R. Co. v. Varnville Co.,
237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915); Southern R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439, 446 (1915).
125. See 43 U.S.C. § 1842 (1986) (Fisherman's Contingency Fund as source of compensa-
tion for losses to commercial fisheries related to OSC development); id. § 1811-18 (Offshore
Oil Spill Pollution Fund); id. § 1346 (environmental studies concerning impact on OCS); id.
§ 1347 (safety and health regulation of OCS operations); 16 U.S.C. § 1456a (1985) (CZMA
Energy Impact Grants Program which seeks "to encourage new or expanded oil and natural
gas production in an orderly manner from the Nation's outer Continental Shelf (OCS) by
providing for financial assistance to meet state and local needs resulting from specified new or
expanded energy activity in or affecting the coastal zone." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1298, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1821); 43 U.S.C.S.
§ 1337 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (revenue sharing of OCS royalties with coastal states to
compensate States for onshore impacts; California received approximately $338 million in
1986).
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would probably prevail, given the lack of language in the Act specifically
addressing onshore support facilities.
The second preemption test is whether the matter is an issue tradi-
tionally left to federal control. Such control can be shown in two ways:
(1) the Act "[touches] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject;" 126 or (2) "the object sought to be obtained by
the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it... reveal
the same purpose." 127
The major United States Supreme Court case cited for these two
tests is Hines v. Davidowitz.128 In Hines, the Court held that the federal
Alien Registration Act barred enforcement of Pennsylvania's Alien Re-
gistration Act. This holding was based on the important national inter-
est in regulating aliens and, more generally, in governing foreign
affairs. 129 In the case of onshore facility ordinances, the question thus
becomes whether the national interest in domestic energy production is a
sufficient basis upon which to imply preemption. While national energy
self-sufficiency is clearly a matter of national interest, it is not a concern
dominated by the federal government. 130 Consequently, it is unlikely
that the general federal interest in encouraging domestic energy produc-
tion would be a sufficient basis upon which to preempt all state
regulation.13'
Even assuming that the federal proprietary interest in ownership of
the OCS itself may evince a federal interest so dominant as to preclude
state regulation of activities on the OCS, the federal interest in having its
lessees bring their offshore mineral production directly to the nearest
shore is not so dominant as to raise a presumption of preemption. As
one commentator noted:
The statute merely asserts American territorial ownership and permits
the Secretary of the Interior to lease tracts for private oil development.
Because zoning and pollution requirements for installations on state
coastal property far removed from the OCS so clearly qualify as "pe-
ripheral concerns" of the regulations of the Outer Continental Shelf
126. Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
127. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
128. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
129. Id. at 73-74.
130. Foreign affairs and immigration law, unlike energy regulation are matters of uniquely
federal concern. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581, 605-06 (1889); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-28
(1972).
131. See Pacific Gas and Elec. Co, v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 220-23
(1982); see also id. at 223 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
453 U.S. 609, 633 (1981) (Court rejected claim that congressional policy favoring the use of
coal as a fuel source preempted state legislation that may have an adverse effect upon coal
consumption.).
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Lands Act, courts should not infer congressional intent to preempt this
area solely on the basis of this statute.132
In light of the lack of specific language regulating onshore support facili-
ties and the Congressional findings that states have the right to preserve
and protect coastal environments through regulation of land use,133 a
court should conclude that Congress did not intend expressly or im-
pliedly to occupy the field of OCS-related activities.
This interpretation is buttressed by recent Supreme Court decisions
upholding state regulatory schemes challenged on the ground that Con-
gress had occupied the entire field. In Pacific Gas and Electric v. State
Energy Resources Commission,134 PG&E challenged a California statute
that required the State Energy Resources Conservation and Develop-
ment Commission to determine that before a nuclear power plant could
be built in the state, "adequate capacity" existed for interim storage of
the plant's spent nuclear fuel. PG&E argued that the Atomic Energy
Act preempted the California statute because the federal act was "in-
tended to preserve the Federal Government as the sole regulator of all
matters nuclear," and therefore the statute fell within the scope of this
impliedly preempted field. 135 In reviewing the legislative history of the
Atomic Energy Act, the Court noted that economic regulation of new
power facilities was traditionally a matter of state concern. The Court
concluded that the Act did not supersede the state's role in this area of
concern and that the federal Act preempted only safety concerns. Conse-
quently, the Court rejected the broad argument that the Act regulated all
matters related to nuclear energy. 136 The Court found economic justifi-
cation for the California statute and therefore upheld the nuclear power
plant moratorium because it regulated a field left to state control.137
Analogizing the reasoning of Pacific Gas and Electric to the onshore
facility ordinance preemption question, local governments can argue that
while the OCSLA may preempt state regulation of the OCS itself, Con-
gress intended land use to be a traditional area of state and local con-
cern. 38 Consequently, a court should not extend the scope of federal
preemption to these onshore OCS-related activities.
The final preemption analysis examines whether there is a direct
132. See Breeden, supra note 2, at 1147 n.184. The author cites the following language
from Decanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360-61 (1976): "[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of
our embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of
doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy, has required us not to find withdrawal
from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral
concern of the [federal regulation]."
133. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(5) (1986).
134. 461 U.S. 190 (1982).
135. Id. at 205.
136. Id. at 211-12.
137. Id. at 216.
138. See supra notes 18, 117-18 and accompanying text.
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conflict between the state and federal statutes. Even when Congress has
not displaced state regulation from a specific field, state law is preempted
to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.139 Such a conflict
arises when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physi-
cal impossibility' 4° or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 141
In applying the first test, it is unclear whether a direct conflict be-
tween state and federal statutes exists on the basis of a "physical impossi-
bility" for lessees to pursue offshore development. Since offshore mineral
development may use either an offshore tanker or processing arrange-
ment or both,I42 federal lessees can develop an offshore lease, although
perhaps at greater cost, without major onshore support facilities. Since
refinery facilities areas already exist in northern California, 43 a court
would not be confronted with a situation in which a state's entire coast-
line was closed to needed oil processing facilities. In that situation, en-
ergy companies could raise a "physical impossibility" argument.
Energy companies may argue that the increased costs of transporta-
tion due to lack of nearby shore support facilites constitute impossibility.
Because companies such as Exxon are seeking to expand their existing
offshore storage and treatment facilities,' 44 it is difficult to support the
argument that increased costs rise to such a degree as to constitute a
"physical impossibility."
The energy companies may also argue that these ordinances are pre-
empted because they indirectly "regulate" or prohibit activities on fed-
eral offshore lands by prohibiting onshore support facilities. According
to a recent series of cases, state and local authority to regulate federal
139. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 106 S.Ct. 1106, 1113 (1986) (quoting Pacific Gas and Elec. Co.
v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1982)).
140. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
141. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 260 (1985) (quoting
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
142. See CITIZENS' GUIDE, supra note 2, at 85; Offshore Oil Battle Goes to the Ballot, San
Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 13, 1986, at 9, col. 5. These facilities are generally referred to as
Offshore Storage and Treatment Facilities (OS&T). Such an offshore arrangement does, how-
ever, raise greater potential environmental hazards. See Response Brief of California Coastal
Commission In re the Appeal by Exxon Company, U.S.A. to the Consistency Objection to
Exxon's Proposed Development of the Santa Ynez Unit 69-90 (Jan. 2, 1987) (appeal to Secre-
tary of Commerce) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
143. See OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 2, IV B.9.a(2)(b)-I & .10.a(2)(b)-l. The Min-
eral Management Service (MMS) Five Year Plan predicts that the current refineries and
marine terminals are adequate to accommodate planned OCS development during this period.
Id. at IV.A.-13 & -33. According to MMS, a new supply base will, however, will need to be
established in either Monterey, San Francisco or Bodega Bay. Id. IV.B.9-24-25.
144. See Oil Industry Is Pressing For California Deposits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1986, at
12, col. 3; [17 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 975-76 (Oct. 24, 1986).
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lands within their boundaries is extremely limited. 145 However, these
cases are distinguishable because the ordinances regulate onshore activi-
ties within the localities themselves and not the federal lands offshore.
The second test of the direct conflict question is whether the state
statute "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes of Congress." 146 The motives underlying the ordi-
nances are at odds with the congressional purpose of expediting offshore
energy production. One motive, for example, is to gain bargaining power
with the federal government and its lessees in areas where the local elec-
torate feels the cost of development outweighs the benefits. However, it
seems unlikely that the Congressional purpose in general conflict with
these motives would be held sufficient to constitute preemption, given the
Supreme Court's application of this test. 147 For example, in Pacific Gas
and Electric 148 the Court noted that while "[t]here is little doubt that a
primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act was, and continues to be, the
promotion of nuclear power," federal licensing and safety regulation as
well as continued preservation of traditional state economic regulation
make clear that this "promotion ... is not to be accomplished at all
costs."' 149 Similarly, federal offshore energy needs have been tempered by
145. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-43 (1976) (Court held that Congress
retains power under the property clause of the Constitution to legislate on all matters relating
to the management and use of federal lands, and these rules override conflicting state and local
law. Absent congressional legislation, however, state and local governments are free to enforce
criminal and civil laws on those lands; Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1986
(9th Cir. 1979) (Court struck down the county's attempt to enforce a permit requirement
against a federal onshore oil and gas lessee), aff'd, 445 U.S. 947 (1980). But see California
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1432 (1987) (upholding State Coastal
Commission's authority to require state permit imposing environmental regulations on lessee's
mining operations on U.S. Forest Service lands); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Con-
servation Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227, 238 (Wyo. 1985) (Wyoming Supreme Court held that a state
drilling permit requirement for operation on federal lands with an access condition was not
preempted by federal law). See generally Burling, Local Control of Mining Activities on Federal
Lands, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 (1986); Freyfogle, Federal Lands and Local Communi-
ties, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 653 (1985).
146. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 260 (1985) (quoting
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
147. See, e.g., California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1431-32
(1987); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 220-23 (1982); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, 453 U.S. 609, 633 (1981).
148. 461 U.S. 190 (1982).
149. Id. at 221-222. But see First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
328 U.S. 152, 166 (a state law which made diversion of water from one river to another illegal
without a state permit was not binding upon the Federal Power Commission (FPC) or its
lessees, since the diversion was the very feature that "[brought] this project squarely under the
Federal Power Act and at the same time gives the project its greatest economic justification"),
reh'g denied, 328 U.S. 879 (1946); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 340
(1958) (although holding that "state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from
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federal environmental and safety regulation and presumably preservation
of traditional local police power over land use decisions.1 50 Conse-
quently, offshore development is not to be accomplished "at all costs."
Furthermore, the preemption cases decided upon the basis of the
above test have relied on specific statutory provisions requiring a result
from which the Court implied preemption. In the Court's most recent
case, Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District,15' the Court
struck down a South Dakota statute requiring local governments to dis-
tribute federal payments in lieu of taxes in the same way they distributed
general tax revenues. The Court held that these state requirements frus-
trated the congressional requirement that "payments . . . [not only]
should go directly to units of local government but also that these new
payments should not be restricted or earmarked for specific purposes."' 52
Since the OCSLA does not contain a similar explicit manifestation of
congressional purpose concerning onshore support facilities, energy com-
panies would have difficulty making such a "frustration of purpose"
argument.
In conclusion, OLSLA preemption of these local zoning ordinances
is unlikely. Given the lack of specific statutory preemption language, a
court is unlikely to rule that Congress expressly preempted state regula-
tion of onshore support facilities. Neither are there grounds upon which
to infer Congressional preemption of the legislative field. The general
lack of a regulatory scheme for onshore facilities suggests that Congress
did not establish a pervasive regulatory scheme upon which a court could
infer a preemptive congressional intent. Moreover, because courts have
generally concluded that energy production does not constitute a domi-
nant federal interest as in the area of foreign affairs, preemption is un-
likely on the basis of the general federal interest in offshore energy
production.
Furthermore, a court will probably not preempt the ordinances on
the basis of a direct conflict with federal law. Since offshore energy pro-
duction can occur using either existing facilities or offshore storage and
treatment facilities or both, the ordinances do not directly conflict with
the OCSLA under a "physical impossibility" test. Finally, the Congress'
issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable
stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States," the Court recognized a
locality's ability to condemn a state fish hatchery and issue bonds to finance the dam even
though it was not empowered to do so under state law) (quoting Washington Dep't of Game v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1953) (emphasis in original)).
150. See supra notes 110, 111, 117, 123 and accompanying text.
151. 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
152. Id. at 264 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1106, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976); see also
id. at 270 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist has generally taken the states' rights
position in preemption cases unless clearly confronted with express Congressional preemption
language. See, eg., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
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mixed motives in adopting the OCSLA and the lack of specific language
in the statute concerning facilities outside the OCS compel the conclu-
sion that these ordinances do not frustrate "the accomplishment of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Moreover, the Supreme Court's more recent posture of not presum-
ing the invalidity of state statutes absent persuasive reasons evidencing
congressional intent favoring preemption further compels the conclusion
that state zoning power over onshore facilities be recognized. 153 Because
zoning powers have traditionally been a matter of local concern, 154 a
court would be even more hesitant to imply preemption without more
explicit statutory language.
III. Commerce Clause Challenge
By placing a flat ban on all pipelines and onshore facilities, these
onshore support facility ordinances may make OCS development off-
shore from certain localities either technologically impossible, or more
likely, prohibitively expensive. Consequently, such ordinances could ef-
fectively force OCS development into other areas. By establishing barri-
ers to the transfer of oil and gas into a locality, these ordinances raise the
question of the extent to which local police or proprietary powers may
extend before violating the limits imposed by the commerce clause of the
Constitution. Because much of the affected oil and gas would enter inter-
state commerce, these ordinances may violate the dormant commerce
clause,' 55 if not insulated by congressional consent through CZMA
approval. 156
Absent congressional exercise of the commerce power, the com-
merce clause prevents the states from erecting barriers to the free flow of
153. See 2 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 295 (1983).
See generally Breeden, supra note 2, at 1143-49; Finnell, Intergovernmental Relationships in
Coastal Land Management, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 31, 39-42 (1985).
154. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 121 (1982); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma,
522 F.2d 897, 909 (9th Cir. 1975) ("well settled that a state regulation [growth control plan]
validly based on the [state] police power does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce
where the regulation neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor operates to disrupt
its uniformity"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
155. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 755-56 (1980), where the Court held that
the flow of gas from the federal OCS to ultimate consumers in other states constitutes inter-
state commerce. The Court reasoned that Louisiana's "first-use" tax on federal OCS products
was unconstitutional under the commerce clause because the tax impermissibly discriminated
against interstate commerce in favor of local interests, since Louisiana's uses of OCS products
were not subject to the first-use tax. The tax was not justified as a "compensatory" tax since
Louisiana had no sovereign interest in being compensated for the severance of resources from
federally owned OCS lands. Id. at 755-56.
156. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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interstate commerce. 157 Not every exercise of local power is invalid
merely because it in some way affects the flow of commerce between the
states. 158 The courts use a balancing test to weigh competing local and
federal interests, often involving delicate, fundamental political questions
concerning the nature of the federal system of government. One must
balance the federal interest in a "national free market" against the tradi-
tional police power of the states and local governments to legislate for the
health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.159
The standard governing judicial review of state regulation under the
commerce clause remains unsettled.' 60  Nevertheless, the courts have
uniformly adopted a strict scrutiny or a "virtual per se" rule of unconsti-
tutionality if the state regulation effectuates economic protectionism.' 6'
A statute that "overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a state's
borders" falls most easily into this category of strict scrutiny.' 62
As a recent Supreme Court case, City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 63 explains: "The crucial inquiry ... must be directed to deter-
mining whether [the statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or
whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local con-
cerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental."' 64
The threshold question in the commerce clause analysis of these ordi-
nances, then, is "whether the primary purpose or effect of the [onshore
support facility ordinances] ... is to favor in-state economic interests or
to burden out-of-state economic interests."' 165
The onshore support facility moratorium ordinances do not facially
157. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-21 (1852).
158. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976); Norfolk S. Corp. v.
Oberley, 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1230 (D. Del. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-5322 (3d Cir. argued
Feb. 9, 1986).
159. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-72 (1981); Minne-
sota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978). Many commentators have criticized this balancing of
interests as improper subjective judicial determinations of the proper role for each level of
government. Absent a congressional determination that a local regulation overburdens inter-
state commerce, these commentators argue that courts should allow local regulation to stand.
See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 435-36 (1982)
(Congress and regulatory agencies will protect national interests worth protecting); Maltz,
How Much Regulation is Too Much - An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 47 (1981); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979
Wis. L. REv. 125.
160. See Norfolk Southern, 632 F. Supp. at 1231 n.12.
161. Id. at 1232; Southern-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984);
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
162. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624.
163. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
164. Id. at 624.
165. Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp. 1369, 1379 (D.
Del.1985) (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624); Bacchus Imports, Ltd.
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discriminate against out-of-state economic interests. 66 The bans apply to
California as well as out-of-state companies. Neither do these ordinances
manifest a discriminatory intent toward out-of-state economic interests.
The moratorium ordinances have a blanket effect on offshore operations
in both state and federal waters by banning onshore support facilities in
the locality's jurisdiction.
Even if the burden of the onshore facility ban fell solely on non-
California energy companies, however, the ban would not manifest a suf-
ficiently discriminatory intent against out-of-state economic interests. 1 67
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,168 the Supreme Court consid-
ered a commerce clause challenge to a Maryland statute that prohibited
producers and refiners of petroleum from operating retail service stations
within the state. Although the divestiture requirement fell solely on in-
terstate companies that operated gasoline stations in Maryland, the court
found no discriminatory intent in the statute. The prohibition did not
lead "either logically or as a practical matter, to a conclusion that the
State is discriminating against interstate commerce at the retail level." 169
Opponents of local ordinances could argue that the ordinances man-
ifest a discriminatory intent against offshore oil operators generally. 170
This-argument would be most plausible where a locality approves an oil
refinery that supports local onshore oil development while banning refin-
eries that support offshore operations in federal waters. In this situation,
a court might conclude that such an action manifests economic protec-
tionism in favor of state onshore oil interests. Local governments, how-
ever, may convincingly respond that the bans prohibit onshore facilities
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984); Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72
(1981); Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Mgrs., Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980).
166. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). In Hughes, an Oklahoma
statute facially discriminated against out-of-state interests by forbidding the transport of min-
nows outside the state. In striking down the statute, the Court specifically noted that the state
had chosen the most discriminatory alternative in effectuating its legitimate local purpose of
conserving its natural minnow population. Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that
Oklahoma's substantial interest in conserving and regulating its natural minnow population
outweighed the minimum burden on commerce of requiring all who export minnows from the
state, residents as well as non-residents, to secure them from hatcheries. Id. at 345-46 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
167. See Cloverleaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 473. (upheld under the Pike test a ban on the
retail sale of milk in nonreturnable plastic containers, recognizing "that the out-of-state plas-
tics industry is burdened relatively more heavily than the Minnesota pulpwood industry");
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1981) (upheld Montana sever-
ance tax on coal, 90% of which is shipped out-of-state).
168. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
169. Id. at 125.
170. Many of the initiatives contain a separate section that manifests the locality's opposi-
tion to federal OCS development and requires the local government body to inform their fed-
eral representatives concerning this opposition. See, e.g., City of Santa Cruz, Cal., Measure A,
supra note 12, § 2; Sonoma County, Cal., Measure A, supra note 13, § II.
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that support offshore operations in either state or federal waters. In City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,171 the Supreme Court held invalid a New
Jersey law that prohibited out-of-state use of landfill sites. The Court
noted, however, that it would be permissible to slow the flow "of all
waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate com-
merce may incidentally be affected."' 172 In burdening state and federal
offshore oil operators, the local ordinances do not seek to protect an in-
state market from out-of-state competition in the same market.173 Con-
sequently, favoring onshore oil operations is not unconstitutionally pro-
tectionist in that both in-state and out-of-state companies can pursue
onshore oil development.
Underlying the general environmental scheme of the ordinances to
protect the locality's coastline from onshore facility development is an
additional purpose: to create political leverage with the federal govern-
ment and the oil interests by erecting obstacles to frustrate implementa-
tion of federal leasing plans. This secondary motive, however, would not
constitute grounds upon which to invalidate the measures. The ultimate
environmental protectionist aim of both purposes is the same and "the
courts would have little basis for distinguishing between the two motives
short of an admission by the [locality]."' 174
In light of the Supreme Court's analyses in Exxon' 75 and Philadel-
phia,'76 the onshore support facility ordinances would not constitute eco-
nomic protectionism but rather "evenhanded regulation" with only
"incidental" effects on interstate commerce. 177 Having cleared this ini-
171. 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
172. Id. at 627.
173. The ordinances do not aim to protect California from out-of-state competition for
offshore minerals. See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 350 (1977) (North Carolina ban on imports of apples bearing a state-grading stamp dis-
criminated against Washington apples); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(1951) (City of Madison, Wis., ordinance requiring that milk be pasturized within ten miles of
the City discriminated against Illinois milk producers).
174. See Breeden, supra note 2 at 1127 n.89. Professor Breeden cites Palmer v. Thomp-
son, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), a case involving the closing of municipal swimming pools for alleg-
edly discriminatory reasons. Justice Black's majority opinion described the Court's attitude
towards considerations of legislative motives:
[It is] difficult or impossible for any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' moti-
vation behind the choices of a group of legislators. Furthermore, there is an element
of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its
supporters. If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its racial
content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature... repassed
it for different reasons.
403 U.S. at 225. See also Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconsti-
tutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. Cr. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motiva-
tion in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
175. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 171-73 and accompanying text.
177. See also Norkfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1236-38 (D. Del. 1986) (In
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tial hurdle in the commerce clause analysis, the court must then balance
the ordinances' burden on interstate commerce against the local benefits
of the regulation.
A common Supreme Court approach for reconciling these interests
is the balancing test as summarized in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. :178
[W]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuat' a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities. 179
Under the Pike balancing test, one must first consider the federal
interest in uniform regulation of offshore energy products and particu-
larly the burden that the local ordinance places on this federal interest.
Courts have systematically struck down state safety requirements when
the need for national uniformity outweighed the potential local bene-
fits.180 The Supreme Court stated in Kassel v. Consolidated Freight-
ways. 181 "[Regulations to promote the public health or safety] may
further the purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so sub-
stantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause."' 18 2 In Kassel, the
Court struck down an Iowa statute that banned sixty-five foot double
trailer trucks from its highways. The plurality argued that when "the
State's safety interest has been found to be illusory, and its regulations
impair significantly the federal interest in efficient and safe interstate
transportation, the state law cannot be harmonized with the Commerce
Clause."' 183 An oil company challenging these ordinances could seize
a determination for the purpose of deciding which test applies should the case be remanded,
the court held that the Delaware Coastal Act (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7001 (1983)), which
prohibits the citing of heavy industry in the Coastal Zone, does not discriminate against inter-
state or foreign commerce.), appeal docketed, No. 86-5322 (3rd Cir. argued Feb. 9, 1987).
178. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
179. Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
180. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959) (struck down Illinois
law requiring particular type of mud guard on trucks using its highways); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945) (invalidated Arizona statute limiting the length of trains
passing through the state).
181. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
182. Id. at 670.
183. Id. at 671. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment but
would have invalidated the law on the grounds that it was "protectionist legislation" because it
aimed at deflecting traffic around Iowa. Id. at 679-86. Justice Rehnquist, in keeping with his
general states' rights approach, dissented, arguing for the necessity of "sensitive consideration"
of the state's safety justifications, and that Iowa had demonstrated those justifications were not
illusory.
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upon these cases to argue that the national interest in uniform and effi-
cient interstate transportation of energy products via pipelines from the
federal OCS to the shore far outweighs any potential local benefit. Be-
cause the onshore support facilities ordinances impair this national inter-
est, the argument goes, they are unconstititutionally impermissible.
However, local governments have strong grounds upon which to
distinguish these cases. Kassel, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,8 4 and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona 18 5 involved statutes that forced wide-
spread out-of-state adoption of particular equipment or operating stan-
dards.' 86 The United States Supreme Court has recognized this type of
disruption to commerce as most profound when the state regulations fo-
cus on the instrumentalities of interstate transportation. In contrast, lo-
cal governments would argue, the onshore facility ordinances do not
raise similar non-uniform standards problems. The ordinances do not
seek to impose specifications on operations outside their jurisdictions, nor
do they focus upon the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
A court might be influenced by the impacts of such ordinances if all
adjacent coastal counties or states enacted total onshore siting bans. 187
This total coastal exclusion could make offshore development impossible.
The ordinance's challengers could argue that national uniform standards
for oil production, refining, and distribution are necessary to avoid local
disruptions of the production of oil across the country.188
184. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
185. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
186. A number of commentators point out that in these situations, as in the economic
discrimination cases, the commerce clause acts as an equal protection mechanism to shield
out-of-state interests from local majorities. See South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 92 (1984); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 326-327 (2d ed. 1978). Crit-
ics of the dormant commerce clause would point out that these out-of-state interests often have
a great deal of economic and political clout both in the state legislature and in the U.S. Con-
gress, and can adequately protect their interests.
187. See discussion of this hypothetical in Breeden, supra note 2, at 1120-27.
188. See Impact of Moratoria on OCS Leasing, supra note 2, at 4. Debate over the impor-
tance of national energy needs often gets rather extreme, as Rep. William Dannemeyer (R.-
Ca.) illustrated when he testified: "[A]s a Member of Congress, I would much rather explain to
the parents who have a son who lives on the coast of California [why] there is a drilling
platform off the coast... tha[n] I want to explain to those parents why we need their son to
come into the military service to possibly fight on the sands of the Middle East to preserve a
resource that some of us in our State our unwilling to develop." Id.
In response to energy security arguments, critics of the Department of Interior's offshore
leasing policies contend that the Reagan administration lacks a consistent energy policy. "The
administration has approached [the current oil glut] with two separate, and fundamentally
inconsistent policies. On the one hand, the American People are told that conservation and
the search for alternative forms of energy are no longer national priorities. The message seems
to be that because oil is cheap, we can stop filling the strategic petroleum reserve, we can
weaken the automobile fuel efficiency standards, we can eliminate tax credits for conservation
and alternative energy resources and we can even export Alaskan crude oil to Japan. On the
other hand, the falling price of oil in no way weakened the Administration's resolve to open
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In reply, local governments would argue that existing refinery sites
in northern and southern California can accommodate expanded offshore
development. 189 The existence of these sites makes the total exclusion
argument improbable, considering that only a handful of coastal govern-
ments have adopted total siting bans. 190 However, because of the inher-
ent flexibility in the weighing and balancing approach, consideration of a
potential total coastal ban could enter into a court's analysis. Although a
court could place controlling emphasis on the possibility of a total
coastal ban, it is more likely to concentrate on the burdens posed by the
specific locality in considering the burdens on interstate commerce. Ac-
cordingly, a local government would argue that a court should examine
almost the entire California OCS to offshore oil and gas development." Mineral Management
Service Hearings on Proposed Five-Year Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program,
held in San Francisco, April 8, 1986 (testimony of Rep. Leon E. Panetta at 1-2).
Another argued inconsistency lies in the fact that "President Reagan has recently vetoed
legislation requiring electrical appliances to meet energy-saving standards that would have
saved the equivalent of over 1.3 billion barrels of oil, almost as much as the 1.8 billion barrels
that the Interior Department has estimated are in the unleased areas off California." N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1987, at 8, col. 2 (quoting Lisa Speer, Senior Scientist, Natural Resources De-
fense Council).
Representative Leon E. Panetta (D.-Ca.) contends that the California OCS is a relatively
insignificant energy source:
Department of Interior's most recent estimates suggests that we can find reserves of
1.88 billion barrels of oil on the unleased portions of the California OCS. National
reserves are estimated at 66.8 billion barrels. Thus California's unleased OCS reserve
represents less than 3% of the Nation's total. Considering Saudi Arabia's proven
reserves of 168.8 billion barrels of oil, it becomes clear that California's OCS re-
sources will not have significant impact on the United States' dependence on foreign
sources of oil.
Testimony of Rep. Panetta, supra, at 2-3.
189. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
190. The localities adopting total bans on onshore support facilities are the cities of San
Francisco, Morro Bay, San Diego and the County of San Mateo. With the possible exception
of San Mateo County and Morro Bay, the oil companies are not presently interested in devel-
oping these areas because they represent a small portion of California's 1,072 miles of coast-
line.
Localities adopting a voter referendum approach have the additional strong argument
that the required referendum process does not add a significant burden to the existing siting
process. In these localities, after the board of supervisors approves an LCP amendment al-
lowing for onshore support facilities, the voters must approve the decision. The Coastal Com-
mission can override the voters' veto. In this context, the burden on interstate commerce
seems procedural, not substantive. If zoning and health and safety regulation are appropriate
subjects for local regulation, it should not make a difference who exercises that power. Conse-
quently, given the present regulatory scheme, it is even more unlikely that the referendum
approach would be seen as unduly burdening interstate commerce.
While approval of onshore moratoria might encourage some localities with the voter ref-
erendum approach to follow that course, there are certain communities which have actually
sought location of onshore development because of the economic benefits involved. The City of
Eureka is an example of a coastal city which has supported offshore oil development for eco-
nomic reasons.
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particular ordiances on a case-by-case basis to determine whether it
places a undue burden on interstate commerce.
In addition, local governments would contend that a national uni-
form standard is improper in this context because Congress, through the
CZMA, recognized the need to consider unique local circumstances.1 91
That Congress has not specifically preempted the field, 192 as it has done
in the economic regulation of natural gas, 193 supports the argument
against a national standard. Given the recognition of local zoning con-
cerns in both the California Coastal Act and CZMA, a court is unlikely
to conclude that there is an overwhelming need for national uniformity
in onshore facilities regulation.
On the other side of the scale in the Pike balancing test are the local
interest and benefits in the regulatory scheme of the ordinance. The
court must consider whether the "statutes effectuate a legitimate public
interest."1 94 Generally, the primary purpose of the ordinances is to pre-
vent the adverse effects of onshore support facilities development, such as
destruction of scarce coastal land, degradation of beaches, excessive
water demands, water and air pollution, and disposal of toxic drilling
mud and other production byproducts. 195 Such land use controls and
pollution and safety measures have long been regarded as proper exer-
cises of the police power. 196 Clearly, these measures effectuate legitimate
public interests and are not illusory.
Professor Breeden argues that a statewide ban on pipelines and on-
shore support facilities by a state might be permissible if it were necessary
for the achievement of a sufficiently critical state interest (such as protec-
tion of some unique or biological resource), or were strictly limited in
191. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
193. See generally Malet, Outer Continental Shelf Oil Pipelines Under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, 43 LA. L. REv. 1143, 1143 (1983).
194. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
195. See supra notes 11-13.
196. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Construction
Ind. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). In Construction Ind. Ass'n, the court upheld the Petaluma growth
control plan as a reasonable and legitimate exercise of the police power. The court refused to
consider a commerce clause argument stating: "It is well settled that a state regulation validly
based on the police power does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce where the regu-
lation neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor operates to disrupt its uniform-
ity." 522 F.2d at 909 (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960)). See also
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, 81 (7th Cir.) (upholding a city ban on
phosphate detergents), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor
Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 649, 517 P.2d 691, 705 (1973) (upholding the Oregon
bottle bill which banned non-returnable beverage containers); Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986) (upholding zoning ordinances against first amendment challenges
that the ordinances violate freedom of expression); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50 (1976) (same).
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duration (such as to allow for necessary preparations onshore to handle
the impacts of new facilities and residents). 197 Almost certainly, courts
would insist on special circumstances distinguishing this state's total ban
from similar bans that might be imposed by other states and that, if up-
held, would bring all OCS development to a halt. In the absence of such
factors, state environmental objectives probably would not be found suf-
ficiently compelling to justify a stranglehold on the flow of OCS oil
through the state. While Professor Breeden's argument is advanced in
the context of a state-wide onshore facilities ban, he raises a number of
critical points that may be applicable to county-wide bans. Under Pro-
fessor Breeden's analysis, a county would need to demonstrate that its
coastline represents either a unique area or contains critical biological
resources or both. Monterey County, for example, could assert the uni-
queness of the nationally recognized scenic Big Sur coastline, currently
under consideration for special federal protection.198 Monterey and the
other counties could also argue that commercial fishing and tourism, so
crucial to their economies, would be threatened by onshore development,
oil spills, and water pollution. 199 Monterey and San Luis Obispo Coun-
ties also contain state wildlife refuges for the endangered sea otter popu-
lation. San Francisco County, which has imposed an onshore facilities
moratorium of two years in order to study the impact of such facilities,
may argue that its ban is only temporary and imposed only to enable the
city to plan for the impact of such development.
When the court weighs the federal and local interests in the Pike
balancing test, the validity of the local ordinances then "becomes one of
degree.' ' 200 The ordinances "will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on ... [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the puta-
tive local interests" taking into consideration the "nature" of those inter-
ests. 20' The extent of the burden imposed of course will vary from case to
case.202 If it is possible for offshore development to continue using facili-
ties outside the locality or if offshore processing is feasible, then the bur-
den imposed on interstate commerce by the ordinance would be limited
197. Breeden, supra note 2, at 1122.
198. See S. 2159, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (In addition to protecting the Big Sur Land area,
Sen. Wilson's Big Sur legislation would ban offshore leasing off the Big Sur Coast.). See gener-
ally Marvinney, Land Use Policy Along the Big Sur Coast of California; What Role for the
Federal Government?, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 93, 97 (1984).
199. See Mineral Management Service Hearings on Proposed Five-Year Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, held in San Francisco, April 8, 1986 (testimony of Rep.
Leon E. Panetta at 7) (Offshore development poses a threat to California's $1.25 billion per
year commercial fishing industry and $16 billion a year tourism industry.). The northern coun-
ties of Sonoma and Mendocino often raise the inadequacy of oil spill clean-up technology in
the rocky and rough waters found along their coastlines. See id. at 5-6.
200. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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to a potential increase in the cost of energy products. In this scenario,
the court would not be faced with an absolute denial of national energy
needs by the locality but rather with the economic burdening of a na-
tional need in exchange for protecting a local interest. The court would
therefore balance a locality's interest in protecting its economic and envi-
ronmental health against the national desire for additional sources of en-
ergy. If it recognized the inherently essential interests involved in zoning
and health and safety measures, a court would likely give greater weight
to these local interests so as to outweigh the burdens on commerce. In
light of the traditional deference given local police power in the absence
of facially discriminating legislation, 20 3 it would be difficult for a court to
rule that the burdens on interstate commerce are clearly excessive.
The final consideration in the commerce clause balancing test in-
volves "whether [the local interests] could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities."' 204 In applying this test to the ordi-
nances, a court would consider whether local governments could protect
their coastlines without intrusively affecting interstate commerce. While
oil companies may argue that these facilities could operate using present
environmental and safety controls without degrading the coastal environ-
ment, such an argument would require a court to inquire into the validity
of the local legislative judgment 2 5 that onshore bans are necessary to
protect the local coastline. The local governments could subsequently
argue that an inquiry into the validity of a legislative judgment oversteps
the boundaries of proper judicial review in applying the reasonable alter-
natives test. The Supreme Court in the Pike case specifically referred to
the putative or purported benefits of the local enactment, indicating that
the court's role in questioning the local government's legislative judg-
ment is limited. 20 6 The court must therefore limit its inquiry to whether
the locality could have protected itself from the perceived threats of on-
203. See supra note 196.
204. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. Recent cases suggest, however, that a court should consider
"less discriminatory" alternatives only after making a finding of discrimination. See Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337-38 (1979); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-
55 (1951). As stated most recently in Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Heintz, 760 F.2d 1408, 1427
(4th Cir. 1985), "[s]o long as the alternative chosen.., does not discriminate... the court will
not find the state's selection to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce because
other equally nondiscriminatory means of achieving the state's purpose exist."
205. The voters acting through the initiative process are exercising legislative powers. See
Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 569-70, 685 P.2d 1152, 1157-58, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801, 806-07
(1984).
206. The Court does consider the probable effects of the state statute. The district court
noted in Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberley, 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1242 n.31 (D. Del. 1986) appeal
docketed, No. 86-5322 (3rd Cir. argued Feb. 9, 1987): "The Pike Court's use of the phrase
'putative benefits' does not mean this Court must accept at face value the Delaware legisla-
ture's assertion of benefits accruing from the statute .... The principal focus of inquiry must
be the practical operation of the statute, since the validity of state law must be judged chiefly in
terms of their probable effects." The court then cited Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
July 1987]
shore oil facilities without burdening oil and gas that was destined for
shipment out-of-state. Unlike the situation in Philadelphia, these ordi-
nances burden both in-state and out-of-state commerce equally.20 7
Consequently, if the court defers to the local government's judgment that
onshore bans are necessary to protect their coastlines (or agrees with its
judgment), the court would presumably conclude that no alternatives are
available to the local governments that have a lesser impact on interstate
commerce.
In conclusion, a court would have strong justifications for upholding
these measures under a commerce clause challenge. The local govern-
ments have not established a "stranglehold" on the entire coast through
the enactment of these ordinances, but instead have shown critical local
interests in preventing onshore support facilities, and have no less dis-
criminatory alternatives by which to advance their interests. The Rehn-
quist Court's "state rights" orientation increases the probability of such a
holding.20 8
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) in which the Court held that the Iowa statute's benefits were "illu-
sory."
Beyond consideration of whether the benefits are illusory, courts have generally deferred
to the judgment of the legislative body. See, e.g., Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325,
328 (1927) (where a zoning ordinance is not clearly arbitrary, the court will not substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the municipal legislative body); Larkin v. Grendel's Den Inc.,
459 U.S. 116, 121 (1982) (because zoning function is traditionally a legislature task requiring
the balancing of competing considerations, courts should refrain from reviewing the merits of
such decisions, absent a strong showing of arbitrariness or irrationality). See also Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Chief Justice Burger stated:
When legislatures and administrators act to protect the physical environment from
pollution and to preserve our resources of forests, streams and parks, they must act
on such imponderables as the impact of a new highway near or through an existing
park or wilderness area. [The] fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable
assumptions about what is good for the people, including imponderable aesthetic
assumptions, is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional.
.1d. at 62.
207. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 687-706 (Rehnquist J., dissenting); Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629-33 (1978) (Rehnquist J., dissenting). In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322, 339-46 (1979) (Rehnquist J., dissenting), now Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: "Given
the primacy of the local interest here [preservation of wild minnows], in the absence of con-
flicting federal regulation, I would require one challenging a state conservation law on Com-
merce Clause grounds to establish a far greater burden on interstate commerce than is shown
in this case" Id. at 343 n.7.
See also Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE
L.J. 1317 (1982). "Accepting for the purposes of discussion the standard liberal view of Justice
Rehnquist as a right-wing ideologue, unsympathetic to claims based upon individual liberties,
and conceding that most of Rehnquist's federalism positions dovetail nicely with conservative
politics, it still must be said that at times 'his federalism' leads Justice Rehnquist to reach
'liberal' results." Id. at 1362-63.
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IV. Political Considerations
The extreme federal-local confrontation posed by the onshore sup-
port facility ordinances raises not only legal problems for the local gov-
ernments but political dangers as well. The primary danger is the threat
of political reaction. It is possible that the energy companies will seek
legislation in Congress or the state legislature to expressly preempt these
onshore support facility bans. In this worse-case scenario, the local gov-
ernments would lose much of their leverage against the energy compa-
nies because clearly the local laws would be preempted by statute.
However, for political reasons it is very unlikely that either the state leg-
islature or Congress would take such intrusive action.209 This is particu-
larly true with respect to the state government, which already holds an
optional veto over local refusals to site energy facilities.
Another political reaction at the federal level would be for NOAA
to strengthen its review power under CZMA by revising the national
interest regulations. By revising these regulations or the LCP amend-
ment review procedures, 210 NOAA might require more specific assur-
ances that certain onshore energy facilities will be sited. While the
language of the Act leaves NOAA limited maneuvering room, the agency
could still seek to extract additional safeguards from coastal states. 211
Second, opponents of the measures argue that these ordinances will
force the location of processing and tanker facilities offshore into federal
waters.212 With these facilities sited in federal waters, local governments
would be unable to regulate the facilities themselves, but instead would
have to rely upon the state Coastal Commission to use the CZMA consis-
tency provisions to control the pollution effects of those facilities. The
danger, of course, is that the Secretary of Commerce may override a state
determination that an offshore facility is inconsistent with its state man-
agement program.213 The override would arguably leave the local gov-
ernments without any control over these facilities.
209. It is much more likely that the oil companies will seek to work through Governor
George Deukmejian and the Reagan Administration to put political pressure on or obstacles in
the way of such a local approach.
210. See supra note 86.
211. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. See generally Kanouse, supra note 25,
at 542 " '[A]dequate consideration of the national interest' is sufficiently ambiguous to be read
as either procedural or substantive requirement." Id. Moreover, given the judicial deference
afforded an administrative agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute it is empowered to
administer, it would be very difficult to challenge these new regulations. See, e.g., Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("A court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.").
212. See Argument Against Measure A, COUNTY OF SAN Luis OBISPO, SAMPLE BALLOT
& VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1986
40-52.
213. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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Last, and perhaps most important, an offshore tanker arrangement
may pose a greater environmental harm as a result of increased risk of oil
spills and tanker accidents. The Coastal Commission generally favors
pipeline transportation of oil and gas as the most environmentally safe
transportation method.214 Consequently, if offshore development pro-
ceeds over the objection of the state and local governments, the Coastal
Commission will favor such a pipeline arrangement.
V. Advice to Local Governments
In light of the above legal and political considerations, it is most
advantageous for the local goverments to adopt the referendum model of
these ordinances.215 The referendum best achieves the essential purpose
of all these ordinances - to gain political leverage with the energy com-
panies and the federal government. First, by not explicitly banning on-
shore support facilities, these ordinances have a better chance of
receiving federal approval under CZMA and a much better chance of
withstanding a preemption or commerce clause challenge. Second, the
referendum model focuses local electoral power without raising political
problems for the state Coastal Commission due to substantive changes in
a LCP's energy siting criteria which may be rejected by the federal Office
of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management. Third, this process places
the oil companies in the position of challenging the authority of local
voters to control the destiny of their own coastline, which may well cre-
ate a politically embarrassing and provocative situation within the very
communities the companies are trying to woo into siting their facilities.
Finally, the threat of a voter veto of a local siting decision may act as a
continuing threat to those seeking offshore development. This manifesta-
tion of local "political will" may also give local boards of supervisors
more clout in negotiating with energy companies and, more immediately,
give greater clout to the locality's representatives in Washington.21 6
The most advantageous statutory language for the ordinances
214. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63 and CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30265 (West
1986). Section 30265, added in 1984 in response to plans for a southern California crude oil
pipeline, sets forth legislative findings that "pipeline transport of oil is generally both economi-
cally and environmentally preferable to other forms of crude oil transport." This provision,
while not binding, may provide a basis for approval of an offshore crude oil pipeline, rather
than an alternative tanker transportation plan which would not require onshore facilities.
215. In the view of the author, the Sonoma County model has the greatest overall chance
of withstanding judicial scrutiny. See County of Sonoma Measure A, supra note 13.
216. See, e.g., Offshore Drilling Plan Makes Waves, San Francisco Chronicle., Feb. 3,
1987, at 1, col. 5. Senator Wilson (R-CA) criticized the Secretary of Interior's new offshore
leasing plan and warned that "local governments all along the coast will erect a seawall [refer-
ring to the onshore support facility ordinances] against the kind of unreasonable and unyield-
ing attitude we have found." Id. at 18, col 4.
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should include specific findings217 relating to the environmental, health,
or safety threats posed by onshore support facilities themselves, in addi-
tion to the threats posed by offshore mineral development. Ideally, the
findings should also include a discussion of the national interest in these
energy facilities and how this interest is outweighed by the threat to the
local area or is being addressed in other ways. For example, the Sonoma
County Ordinance discusses the county's contribution to the state's en-
ergy needs and the need for a balanced national energy policy before
proceeding with extensive offshore development. 2 18 Another potential
advantage, as demonstrated in the Sonoma Ordinance, would be
achieved by narrowly drafting the ordinance to require a voter referen-
dum only on proposed LCP amendments, thereby avoiding a possible
due process challenge that adjudicatory actions-issuance of permits or
other authorizations-have been improperly put to a voter
referendum. 219
In sum, while onshore support facility ordinances may pose public
policy and legal questions, they are ingenious political mechanisms.
They allow the locality to buy time for its supporters in Congress to force
the next administration's Department of Interior to take a sensitive bal-
anced approach to offshore development, a cooperative approach that
was mandated by Congress when it enacted the OCS Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978 and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.220 These
ordinances are a warning to those who seek to renege on this cooperative
federalism approach. The local governments are saying in effect, "We,
too, have a trump card in this offshore battle; we hold the beachheads."
VI. Conclusion
At first impression, it would seem that the most difficult challenge
facing the onshore support facility ordinances will take place at the state
level. The ordinances effecting outright bans on onshore facilities facially
appear to conflict with the energy siting provisions of the Coastal Act.
However, the Coastal Act's local override provisions will probably save
these ordinances. 221 This override may be seized upon by the Coastal
Commission, which in the past has been generally sympathetic to the
local governments' concerns with offshore development, 22 2 as a justifica-
tion for upholding these ordinances. Depending upon the outcome at the
federal level, the energy companies could challenge the Coastal Commis-
217. See Building Indus. Ass'n of S. California, Inc. v. City of Comarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810,
824, 718 P.2d 68, 76, 226 Cal. Rptr. 81, 89 (1986).
218. See County of Sonoma Measure A, supra note 13.
219. See supra note 41.
220. See supra notes 119, 17-28 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying note 65.
222. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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sion's approval in state court. However, in applying the generally defer-
ential standard of judicial review, a court would likely affirm the Coastal
Commission's approval.223 Presumably, a reviewing court would also be
influenced by both the state override provision and the traditional view
that zoning is a matter of local concern.
The Secretary of Commerce would then have to consider the ordi-
nances' impact on the California Coastal Management Program. Given
the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management's growing polit-
ical hostility toward measures restricting onshore energy facilities, the
ordinances' chances for approval are shaky at best.224 The lack of action-
inducing requirements in present CZMA national interest regulations is a
factor in favor of approval of these regulations. 225 Under the current
interpretation, the Secretary of Commerce presumably must approve the
amendment. Supporting such a conclusion is NOAA's continued certifi-
cation of Delaware's coastal management program that bans entirely
new heavy industry in its coastal zone.226 However, given OCRM's re-
cent rejections of mild LCP language involving onshore support facili-
ties, 227 the onshore support facility bans may be destined for rejection.
The voter referenda ordinances, by not explicitly prohibiting onshore fa-
cilities, have a better chance of approval.
With regard to the constitutional challenges, a court is unlikely to
conclude that Congress has preempted state regulation of onshore sup-
port facilities through either the OCSLA or the CZMA. Without more
explicit language concerning onshore support facilities in the OCSLA, a
court would presumably be very hesitant to infer an implied preemption
of this field of state regulation on the basis of general federal interests in
OCS production or in national energy self-sufficiency. 228
If approved under the CZMA, the onshore support facility ordi-
nances would likely be upheld under a commerce clause attack.229 Even
without congressional consent under CZMA, because the ordinances
neither constitute economic protectionism nor discriminate against inter-
state commerce, it is likely they would be upheld as legitimate exercises
of the local police power.230 Consequently, even if the ordinances were
rejected as amendments to California's Coastal Management Plan, the
223. See City of Chula Vista v. California Coastal Comm'n, 133 Cal. App. 3d 472, 488-90,
183 Cal. Rptr. 909, 918-19 (1982) (reviewing the Coastal Commission's "independent judg-
ment" consideration of an LCP's conformity with the Coastal Act using a substantial evidence
test). See also Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d 561, 572, 685 P.2d 1152, 1159, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801,
808 (1984) (citing City of Chula Vista).
224. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying note 154.
229. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 155-208.
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local governments could still enforce their onshore zoning provisions. By
enforcing a rejected LCP provision, however, a state would be running
the risk of losing its CZMA money and having its coastal program
decertified. 231
While the local governments face political danger in that Congress
or NOAA may seek to preempt the local measures, these ordinances are
politically powerful weapons in the local governments' struggle to have
their voices heard in the federal offshore leasing process. By manifesting
strong local opposition to unrestrained offshore development, such ordi-
nances not only strengthen the negotiating position of the local govern-
ments' supporters in Congress, but also signal a loud warning to the U.S.
Department of Interior and the energy companies. Onshore support fa-
cility ordinances are strong reminders that offshore mineral development
cannot take place in an efficient and orderly manner without the coopera-
tion of local governments. As Sonoma County Supervisor Ernie Carpen-
ter explains, "Those people in the White House and the Department of
Interior have their sagebrush rebellion.... Well, we have our seaweed
rebellion, and they're going to have to take it seriously. '232
Breck C. Tostevin*
231. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
232. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 13, 1986, at 9, col. 3. "Sagebrush rebellion" refers to
the states' rights movement concerning federal lands in the western United States.
* Member, Second Year Class. The author wishes to thank Mary Hudson, Dan Haif-
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